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NOTES AND COMMENTS

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Accord and Satisfaction-Cashing Check Marked In Full
Payment-Conditional Request to Stop Payment
of Check
A dispute having arisen over coal transportation charges, the
debtor, on May 26th, sent a check marked in full payment as shown
in voucher. The voucher showed that the check covered the admitted
difference between the freight and the claim for damages, but there
was no further indication of the debtor's desire for an accord and
satisfaction. That the creditor so understood the desire was shown,
however, in his reply of the 27th, saying the check was acceptable
only on account and, if not agreeable, for the debtor to stop payment
on it. This letter reached the debtor on the 31st, the same day the
check was collected, having been deposited on the 28th. The debtor
did not stop payment and on June 3rd replied, reiterating the position
taken in his first letter. Held, there was no accord and satisfaction,
as the creditor did not voluntarily assent; and there was no compromise, as no new consideration was given, since the debtor had paid
only the sum he admittedly owed and no part of the disputed
amount. 1
Did not the creditor voluntarily assent? There must be mutual
assent but this does not necessarily involve mental assent, since assent
will be implied from the circumstances and conduct inconsistent with
a refusal. 2 It has been held that the acceptance of a check necessarily
involves an acceptance of the conditions upon which it was tendered,
even though at the time the creditor protests.&3 It is generally held
that the creditor has but one alternative and must accept the amount
I Moore and McCormack Co. v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 37 F. (2d) 308
(C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
*Redmond v. Atlanta & B. Air Line Ry., 129 Ga. 133, 58 S. E. 874 (1907);
Woburn National Bank v. Woods, 77 N. H. 172, 89 At. 491 (1914).
' Northern Trust Co. v. Knowles, 208 Ill. App. 258 (1917) ; G. & L. Realty
Co. v. Friedman, 105 Misc. Rep. 632, 173 N. Y. Supp. 376 (1919); (1923) 9
VA. L. Rwc. (N. S.) 307; 3 WILL.ISTON, ON CONTRACTS, 1924, §1854; Note
(1925) 34 A. L. R. 1044. But cf. Goldmith v. Lichtenberg, 139 Mich. 163,
102 N. W. 627 (1905); Day v. McLea, L. R. 22 Q. B. Div. 610, 60 L. T.
(N. S.) 947, 58 L. J. Q. (N. S.) 293, 37 Week. Rep. 483, 53 J. P. 532 (Eng.
1889). But cf. Hirachand Punamchand v. Temple, 1911 2 K. B. Div. 330.
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tendered upon the terms of the condition or return the check. 4 The
right to name the terms rests alone with the debtor.5
Can the creditor shift the onus of acting upon the debtor and take
the failure to stop payment as a confirmation? The offeree is at
liberty to accept wholly, or reject wholly, 'but one of these things he
must do; for if he answers proposing to accept under a modification,
this is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter offer which
necessitates an acceptance as did the original offer.0 Generally speaking, if an offeror makes no reply to a counter offer, his silence and
inaction cannot be construed as assent, and this is true even in the
7
face of a statement that his silence would be taken as an acceptance.
A debtor must at least be given time to waive the conditions and, if
the creditor acts before the conditions are waived, it should be considered as an acceptance of the former terms.8 In the principal case
the creditor evidently understood the debtor's desire9 for an accord
and satisfaction and, despite this, he acted before receiving the
debtor's letter of Jfine 3rd which was certainly no waiver of the
conditions.
It is submitted that public policy will be 'better served by encouraging settlements and compromises out of court and that the
result attained here will discourage such attempts, since the creditor
"Seeds, Grain & Hay Co. v. Conger, 83 Ohio St. 169, 93 N. E. 892, 32
L. R. A. (N. S.) 380 (1910) ; Ex parte Southern Cotton Oil Co., 207 Ala. 704,
93 Sou. 662, aff'd. 20 Ala. App. 1, 102 Sou. 149 (1922); 3 W.LISTON, ON
CONTRACTS (1924) §1856; Hoop v. Kansas Flour Mills Co., 124 Kan. 769, 262
Pac.
544 (1928).
5
Cunningham v. Standard Const. Co., 134 Ky. 198, 119 S. W. 765 (1909).
Cozart v. Herndon, 114 N. C. 252, 19 S. E. 158 (1894).
'Felthouse v. Bindley, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 869, 31 L. J. C. P. 204, 6 L. T. 157,
10 W. R. 423, 142 Eng. Rep. 1037 (1862) ; Prescott v. Jones, 69 N. H. 305, 41
At. 352 (1898) ; 1 WiLLIsToN, ON CONTRACTS (1924) §§91-92. But cf. Haddow v. Owens Co., 172 Wis. 391, 179 N. W. 508 (1920); Burton Coal Co. v.
Gorman Coal Co., 22 Ohio App. 383, 153 N. E. 863 (1926) (In face of obvious
duty the debtor must act or otherwise the creditor's using the check will be no
accord and satisfaction).
Discussed in (1927) 1 CiN. L. REV. 218.
'Policastro v. Pitske, 65 Misc. Rep. 524, 120 N. Y. Supp. 743 (1910).
(Creditor's using the check without waiver of the conditions by the debtor is
an accord and satisfaction and the debtor's mere silence in face of a counter
proposal was no waiver of his conditions); 4 PAGE, ON CONTACTS (1920)
§2504; Sylva Supply Co. v. Watt, 181 N. C. 432, 107 S. E. 451 (1921). When
there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties then it is otherwise; Egan
v. Crowther, 48 Cal. App. 362, 241 Pac. 900 (1925), discussed in (1925-26) 14
CA w. L. Rv. 250.
*In a few states the burden is on the debtor to make absolutely positive
that the creditor understands his intention for an accord and satisfaction.
Dimmick v. Banning, etc. Co., 256 Pa. 295, 100 At]. 871 (1917). But cf. Davis
Sulphur Ore Co. v. Powers, 130 N. C. 152, 41 S. E. 6 (1902) (Where, "which
balances account," is held to sufficiently show intent).
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can impose new duties on the debtor while having the advantage of
the debtor's check in his possession as a threat. In any event, the
reasoning of the present case seems open to criticism as it results in
permitting the creditor to shift the burden of acting upon the debtor
without giving a reasonable length of time in which to act. The same
result could more logically be attained on the ground of lack of consideration, since no part of the disputed amount was paid but only
the sum admittedly due. 10
HUGH B. CAMPBELL.
Agency-Bills and Notes-Agent's Indorsement of Check
Drawn to Principal's Order
An attorney, with authority to settle his client's claim, received a
check payable jointly to himself and the client. He indorsed for both,
cashed the check, and retained the proceeds. Held, the transaction
amounted to payment to the attorney of the amount of cash represented by the check and received thereon, and was payment of client's
claim.'
Although some courts show a tendency to hold that an attorney
with authority to settle a client's claim has implied authority to indorse a check received in payment, 2 the rule generally laid down is
that authority to indorse negotiable paper will not be implied unless it
is absolutely necessary to the carrying out of the purpose of the
agency.8 By this rule, the check in the instant case was wrongfully
indorsed.
"Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204,
103 N. E. 695 (1913) (Refuses -to follow idea of no voluntary assent by
creditor but gets the same result on ground of no consideration) ; Hamburger
v. Economy Dept. Store, 222 N. W. 603 (S. D. 1928) ; (1929) 14 IowA L. Rv.
474. Contra: Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Clark, 178 U. S. 353, 20 Sup. Ct. 924, 44
L. ed. 1099 (1899) ; 1 WILLISTON, ON CONTRACTS (1924) §129; Schnell v. Perlmon, 238 N. Y. 362, 144 N. E. 641, 34 A. L. R. 1023, aff'd 239 N. Y. 504,
147 N. E. 171 (1924). Discussed in (1924) 2 N. Y. L. REV. 414; Shapleigh
Hardware Co. v. Farmer's Federation Inc., 195 N. C. 702, 143 S. E. 471
(1928). See also, May Bros. v. Doggett, 124 Sou. 476 (Miss., 1929). If th6
disputed portion belongs to a separate and distinct transaction then it cannot
carry over so as to apply to the admitted indebtedness and create a dispute as
to it, Brent v. Whittington, 214 Ala. 613, 108 Sou. 567 (1926). But cf. Sylva
Supply Co. v. Watt, supra note 8. For general discussion see (1925) 9 MiNN.
L. REv. 458; (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 71.
'Patterson v. Southern Ry. Co., 151 S. E. 818 (Ga. App. 1930).
'Nat. Bank of the Republic v. Old Town Bank, 112 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 7th,
1902) ; Brown v. Grimes, 74 Ind. App. 655, 129 N. E. 483 (1921) ; 1 THORNTON,,
ATTYs. AT LAW (1914) 363, 364.

'Bank of. Morganton v. Hay, 143 N. C. 326, 55 S. E. 811 (1906) ; Crahe v.
Mercantile etc. Bank, 295 Ill. 375, 129 N. E. 120 (1920) ; Note (1921) 12 A. L.
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Under such circumstances, the weight of authority allows an
action by the client or principal against the drawee bank, either on the
theory that payment on unauthorized indorsement constitutes accep4
tance, or on the theory that the bank is guilty of a conversion. If
the check is cashed by a bank other than the drawee, and then collected, an action lies against the cashing bank-even in jurisdictions
which would not allow an action against the drawee.0
When the principal sues the debtor, however, he is generally denied recovery as in the instant case. 7 The basis of these decisions
AGENCY RESTATEMENT (Am. Law. Inst. 1928) §§366 and 347 comment
(d). Contra: Lorton v. Russel, 27 Neb. 372, 43 N. W. 112 (1889) ; Chamberlin, etc. Co. v. Bank of Pleasanton, 107 Kan. 79, 190 Pac. 742 (1920) (holding
that a collecting agent has apparent authority to indorse checks received).
"Dawson & White v. Nat. Bank of Greenville, 197 N. C. 499, 150 S. E. 38
(1929) (acceptance) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Citizens & Peoples Nat. Bank,
74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 104 (1917) (conversion); (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1143;
(1926) 26 COL. L. REv.113; Note (1921) 14 A. L. R. 764.
First Nat. Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343, 24 L. ed. 229 (1877) is the
leading case denying recovery on theory of acceptance. But see Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Bank of Charleston, 267 Fed. 367, 370 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920)
which intimates that under same cirdumstances an action for conversion 'would
well lie.
Pennsylvania would probably refuse recovery on either theory. Tibby
Bros. Glass Co. v. Farmers and Mechanics Bank, 220 Pa. 1, 69 Atl. 280 (1908).
'Schaap v. State Nat. Bank, 137 Ark. 251, 208 S. W. 309 (1918); Porges
v. U. S. Mortgage & Trust Co., 203 N. Y. 181, 96 N. E. 424 (1911); (1929)
77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 127; Note (1924) 31 A. L. R. 1068:
The Pennsylvania rule is contra: Tibby Bros. Glass Co. v. Farmers &
Mechanics Bank, supra note 4.
'Merchants Bank v. Nat. Capital Press, 288 Fed. 265 (Ct. of App., Dist.
of Col., 1923). See also Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bank of Charleston, supra
note 4.
"When a debtor delivers his check to the'creditor or his agent, duly
authorized to receive it, and has funds in the bank to meet the check, the
transaction, as between debtor and creditor, should be treated as payment,
precisely as though cash had been paid, even though the agent forges an indorsement and steals the money." Burstein v. Sullivan, 134 App. Div. 623,
119 N. Y. S. 317, 319 (1909); Morris v. Hofferberth, 81 App. Div. 512, 81
N. Y. S. 403 (1903) ; Morrison v. Chapman, 155 App. Div. 509, 140 N. Y. S.
700 (1913) ; McFadden v. Follrath, 114 Minn. 85, 130 N. W. 542 (1911) ; Mills
v. Hurley, etc. Co., 129 Ark. 350, 196 S. W. 121 (1917) ; Monacelli v. Traeger,
239 Ill. App. 30 (1925). But see Merchants Bank v. Nat. Capital Press, supra
-note 6, at.266.
As pointed out in McFadden v. Follrath, supra, ThomsQn v. Bank of British
North America, 82 N. Y. 1 (1880) and Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Ivy
Leaf Coal Co., 97 Ala. 705, 12 So. 395 (1892) are distinguishable.
Siegel v. Kovinsk, 93 Misc. 541, 157 N. Y. S. 340 (1916) relies on the
Thomson case, supra, and says the debtor is still liable. In Siegel v. Kovinsk,
however, the agent did not even have authority to collect cash.
The New York Supreme Court held the debtor liable in Bernheimer v.
Herrman, 44 Hun 110 (1887) (check was given to bookkeeper). There seems
to be no valid distinction between this case and the group holding the debtor
was not liable.

t 111;
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seems to be equitable considerations rather than the result of legal
reasoning." In seeking to hold the debtor, it is generally argued that
he can recoup his loss by bringing suit against the drawee bank; but
in the words of the New York Supreme Court, "Defendant should
not be compelled to pay twice, or be subjected to the hazard of a law
suit with the bank, for having taken the precaution to protect plaintiffs by making a check payable to their order." Justice Simpson of
the Minnesota Court puts a supposed case in which the drawee bank
becomes insolvent immediately after paying the check, and then says
that the loss which must result should fall on the person who chose
the dishonest agent.' 0
When the debtor gives a check or draft on himself and pays it on
an agent's indorsement of the creditor's name, the case seems a
stronger one for the debtor, since the paper is very much like a receipt
signed in creditor's name by his agent."'
If the check was made payable to the agent, then a fortiori the
2
principal's claim is paid.'
If an agent has authority to accept cash, many courts say that, in
view of modern business methods, he has authority to accept a
check.' 3 However, the question as to such authority would seem to
4
be immaterial if the check is actually paid.'
HUGH L. LOBDELL.
The Pennsylvania court apparently would hold the debtor liable. Tibby
Bros. Glass Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, supra note 4.
See (1916) 16 COL. L. Rav. 430 for conclusion contra to the instant one.
"The reasoning of the Pennsylvania court in Tibby Bros. Glass Co. v.
Farmers & Mechanics Bank, supra note 4, seems sounder from a purely analytical standpoint; the bank has paid out its own money, the debtor has lost
nothing, and the original position of the debtor and creditor has not been
altered.
' Burstein v. Sullivan, supra note 7, at 319.
1 McFadden v. Follrath, supra note 7. It could be argued with equal force
that the loss should fall on the depositor who chose an unsound bank.
'- Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Assn., 63 Neb. 698, 88 N. W_
863 (1902) ; Hart v. Northwestern, etc. Bank, 191 Ill. App. 396 (1915). But
cf. Lochenmeyer v. Fogarty, 112 Ill. 572 (1884).
'Potter v. Sager, 184 App. Div. 327, 171 N. Y. S. 438 (1918); Pacific
Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 95 Cal. App. 365, 272 Pac. 1084 (1928) ; Gibson v.
Ward, 9 Ga. App. 363, 71 S.E. 506 (1911) ; (1929) 38 YALE L. J.995.
"Potter v. Sager; Gibson v. Ward, both smpra note 12.
' Harbach v. Colvin, 73 Ia. 638, 35 N. W. 663 (1887); see Brown v
Grimes, supra note 2. But see Hamling v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 34 F. (2d)
112, 116 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) for theory that when he received the check, the
agent became the debtor's agent to transmit the proceeds to the creditor.
Where agent takes collateral security without authority, the proceeds from
its sale have been held payment of principal's craim, though the agent embezzled such proceeds. Block v. Drake, 2 Colo. 330 (1874); Holliday v.
Thomas, 90 Ind. 398 (1883).
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Bills and Notes-Checks--Burden and Manner of Proving
Loss Caused Drawer by Delay in Presentment
In a recent case the defendant, drawer, gave his check to one McDaniels who had not presented the check for payment when the
drawee bank closed its doors because of insolvency thirteen days later.
The endorsee of the check brought action on it. The drawer demurred claiming the delay in presentment discharged him. The lower
court sustained the demurrer. Reversed, on the ground that the defendant should not only show delay in order to be excused but also
a loss.'
The frequent failures of banks at the present time make the
question a very important one, since most of the causes of loss by
unreasonable delay arises through failure of the drawee banks. 2
Since the general rule applicable to bills of exchange, "that presentment is sufficient to charge the secondary parties, if made within
a reasonable time from the last negotiation thereof"8 has no application to the liability of the drawer of a check, to whom a special rule
of liability is laid down, 4 no question concerning the liability of the
drawer is raised, in the instant case, by the negotiation from the payee
to Mrs. McDaniel.5
Reasonable Time for Presentment
In order to preserve his rights against the drawer of a check the
holder must present it for payment to the drawee within a reasonable
time, or in case of loss caused thereby the drawer is discharged to the
'McDaniel v. Mackey, 150 S. E. 439 (Ga. 1929).
'Carroll v. Sweet, 128 N. Y. 19, 27 N. E. 763 (1891) ; Gordon v. Levine,
194 Mass. 418, 80 N. E. 505, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153 (1907); Palmer v.
Harris, 142 S.E. 276 (Ga. 1928). A rather unusual case is presented by Ferrari
v. First Nat'l Bank of Connesville, Pa., 159 N. E. 178 (N. Y. 1927) where the
drawer had no funds in the drawee, but the drawee bank agreed to cash the
check and charge against the account of a bank in which the drawer did have
funds, and the failure of this latter bank coupled with delay in presentment
was held to excuse the drawer.
'N. I. L. §70; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann (1919) §3051.
"'N.I. L. §186; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3168: A check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer
is discharged to the extent of his loss caused by the delay.
'The indorser is discharged by unreasonable delay in presenting the check
regardless of the loss. And in this case the check must be presented for payament by the close of the business day following its delivery to the endorsee.
Comer v. Dufour, 95 Ga. 376, 22 S.E. 543 (1895); Mauney v. Coit, 80 N. C.
.300, 30 Am. Rep. 80 (1879) ; Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, 93 Tenn. 409, 24 S. W.
1130 (1894); Nuzum v. Sheppard, 87 W. Va. 243, 104 S.E. 587, 11 A. L,R.
1024 (1920).
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extent of that loss.8 Where the check is drawn on a local bank the
check must be presented to the drawee bank for payment by the close
of the next business day following receipt of it by the payee, in the
absence of special circumstances.7
"N. I. L. §186; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3168, supra note 4; Carroll
v. Sweet, sup-a note 2; Krauss v. Aleck, 209 N. W. 444 (Iowa 1926); Swift
& Co. v. Miller, 62 Ind. App. 312, 113 N. E. 447 (1916); Hazard Bank and
Trust Co. v. Morgan, 211 Ky. 137, 277 S. W. 307 (1925) ; Merritt v. Gate City
Nat'l Bank, 100 Ga. 147, 27 S. E. 979 (1897); Koch v. Sandford Loan and
Realty Co., 286 S. W. 732 (Mo. 1926).
'First Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v. Alexander, 84 N. C. 30 (1883); Lewis,
Hubbard & Co. v. Montgomery Supply Co., 59 W. Va. 75, 52 S. E. 1017, 4
L. R. A. (N. S.) 132 (1906); Colwell v. Colwell, 92 Ore. 103, 179 Pac. 916,
4 A. L. R. 876 (1919) ; Gordon v. Levine, supra note 2.
However, when the holder has knowledge of the shaky condition of the
drawee there are some jurisdictions which say the holder must present the
check at the earliest time possible. Temple v. Carroll, 75 Neb. 61, 105 N. W.
989 (1905); First Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v. Alexander, supra note 7, approved in First Nat'l Bank of Kewanee v. Wine, 47 BANKxES LAw JoUaNAL
220 (II. App. 1930).
If the drawee is located in another city or town from that in -which the
holder resides a different rule for presentment is laid down and the check
must be sent by some usual means of communication on the day following its
receipt for collection and the party who finally receives it for collection must
present it to the drawee by the close of the business day following its receipt
by him. Thus two days are allowed for each step in the chain of collection.
Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Montgomery Supply Co., 59 W. Va. 75, 52 S. E.
1017 (1906). And no bank in the chain of collection is chargeable with negligence if it forwards the check on to the next bank by the close of the business
day following its receipt. Wallace v. City Nat'l Bank, 202 Ala. 323, 80 So.
405 (1918) ; Douchester v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank of Houston, 106 Tex. 201,
163 S. W. 5 (1914); Plover Savings Bank v. Moodie, 135 Iowa 685, 110 N. W.
29 (1906). However, it seems that the next day rule should be straightened
in one place. It seems only right that the intermediate banks in the chain of
collection should mail the paper on to the next bank in the chain on the day
of its receipt, unless it is received after the close of business hours. In fact
some banks in Philadelphia, Chicago and Kansas City advertise that they maintain 24 hour transit departments. But it should not be supposed that sending
the check on to another bank, no matter where it was, would satisfy the duty
of the collecting bank. It has been considered unreasonable delay to send the
check from, or across, the place of payment, instead of toward, or to it. Gifford v. Hardell, 88 Wis. 538, 60 N. W. 1064 (1894). This does not mean that
the check must be sent in a line that a bird would fly, but merely by the usual
commercial route. Sublette Exch. Bank v. Fitzgerald, 168 Ill. App. 240 (1912).
This allows evidence as to the custom of banks to be put in to show the reasonableness of a route. But even custom will not justify the choosing of an
absurd route. The Federal Reserve System has diminished the importance of
this point and in all probability the routing of the Federal Reserve will be held
free from negligence.
Two rather unusual cases of circuitous routing were: Where the payee sent
a local check across Chicago to another bank which was not a member of the
clearing house instead of presenting to the drawee as he might have reasonably
done. And when the check was delayed in reaching the drawee, which had
failed in the meantime, the drawer was discharged. National Plumbing and
Heating Co. v. Stevenson, 213 Ill. App. 49 (1918). And where the local agent
of a firm -was given a check and instead of presenting the same for payment
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Where the check is deposited in a local bank other than the
drawee most jurisdictions refuse to allow extra time for collection
through the clearing house, and hold that the check must still reach
the drawee by the close of the next business day following receipt by
the payee, 8 but some jurisdiction properly recognize the custom and
demands of present day business and allow an extra day in such
cases.9 "Checks are not designed for circulation as mediums of
exchange or credit but as cash items for immediate payment and so
should be presented with all dispatch and diligence consistent with
attendant circumstances."' 10
A failure to make presentment within the time stated is prima
facie a case of failure to make presentment within a reasonable
time." And according to the majority view these facts coupled with
the failure of the drawee will be prima facie a case of loss to the
drawer, since he is presumed to draw his checks against sufficient
funds to pay them. However, these facts will not preclude a finding,
under facts peculiar to a particular case, that a longer delay was in
fact reasonable.' 2 In determining what is a reasonable time in a parhe sent it on to headquarters and the check did not reach the drawee for nearly
a week, it having failed before presentment, the drawer was discharged. Republic Metalware Co. v. Smjth, 218 Ill. App. 130 (1920).
'Grange v. Reigh, 93 Wis. 552, 67 N. W. 1130 (1896); Carroll v. Sweet,
supra note 2; Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, supra note 5; Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y.
171 (1870); Edminstein v. Herpolsheimer Co., 66 Neb. 94, 92 N. W. 138, 59
L. R. A. 934 (1901) ; Alexander v. Burchfield, 7 Man'& G 1061, 135 Eng. Rep.
431 (1842).
'Loux v. Fox, 171 Pa. 63, 33 Atl. 190 (1895); Willis v. Finley, 173 Pa. 28,
34 Atl. 213 (1895) ; Bristline v. Bentling, 39 Idaho 534, 228 Pac. 309 (1924).
" Gordon v. Levine, supra note 2; Kennedy v. Jones, 140 Ga. 302, 78 S. E.
1069 (1913); First Nat'l Bank of Wymore v. Miller, 37 Neb. 500, 55 N. W.
1064 (1893).
'Pelt v. Marlar, 95 Ark. 111, 128 S.W. 554 (1910).
"Such matters have been held to excuse a longer delay: Request by the
drawer that the check not be presented immediately. Pollard it. Bowen, 57
Ind. 232 (1897); Tarasek v. Koscuiszko Bldg. & L. Assn., 218 Ill.
App. 487
(1920). Lack of funds in the drawer's account to meet the check. Emory v.
Hobson, 63 Me. 32 (1873) ; Bodner v. Rotman, 95 N. J. Eq. 910, 123 Atl. 529
(1924). Even if the funds are withdrawn after a reasonable time for presentment has expired this will still prevent the drawer from being discharged.
Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Hatworth, 296 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924).
Sudden and severe illness of such severeness as to prevent the holder from
securing an agent to present. Wilson v. Senier, 14 Wis. 380 (1861). Other
cases excusing delay: Joerns Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Burns, 173 Minn. 389, 217 N. W.
506 (1928); Coxe v. Boone, 8 W. Va. 500 (1875).
By reason of the special statute concerning them it was held that a railroad
was not forced to present a check received for hauling goods -promptly to keep
from discharging the drawer. Fullerton v. Chicago M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 36
F. (2d) 180 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
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-ticular case regard must be had to the nature of the instrument, the
usage or custom of trade or business (if any) both with respect to
such instrument and also to the facts of the particular case. 13 Ordinarily this will be a question for the jury in each case. 14
Burden of Proving Loss by Delay
Assuming the unreasonable delay, the further question arises as
to whether the drawer must sustain the burden of proof upon the
issue of loss as a defense, and show loss to himself, or whether the
holder must negative the loss in order to recover.
All courts agree that if the payee puts the check in evidence and
proves the drawer's signature he is entitled to recover, if nothing else
appears,' 5 and force the drawer wishing to rely on delayed presentment as a defense to prove the unreasonable delay.' 6 But on the next
In the case of accepting checks for taxes under somewhat similar statutes
requiring cash for payment, Palmer v. Harris, supra note 2, said that delay in
jpresentment made the check becojne final payment to the extent of the drawer's
loss. But Moritz v. Nicholson, Tax Collector, 141 Miss. 531, 106 So. 762
(1926) held that unreasonable delay in such cases did not discharge the drawer
as this could only be done by actual payment.
N. I. L. §193; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2978; McFadden v. Keesee,
16 S.W. (2d) 994 (Ark. 1929) ; Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Goodman,
292 S. W. 659 (Ark. 1927). Yates v. Goodwin, 96 Me. 90, 51 Atl. 804 (1901).
When the drawer has a check certified and sent to the payee as a general rule
it seems that this will not extend the time for presentment of the check, nor
will it affect the rights of the parties. Blake v. Hamilton Dime Savings Bank
Co., 79 Ohio St. 189, 87 N. E. 73, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 290, 16 Ann. Cas. 210
(1908) ; Blair & Hoge v. Wilson, 69 Va, 165 (1877). City of Brunswick v.
Peoples Savings Bank, 194 Mo. App. 360, 190 S.W. 60 (1916). Contra: in
Smith v. Hubbard, 205 Mich. 44, 171 N. W. 546 (1919), it was held that certification of a check by the drawer extended the time of presentment as in this
condition the check became more of the nature of currency. But certification
by the holder discharges the drawer at once without delay or loss since the
holder substitutes the banks credit for that of the drawer. Met. Nat'l Bank v.
Jones, 137 Ill. 634, 27 N. E. 533, 12 L. R. A. 492 (1891). As to cashier's
checks and drafts the time for presentment varies with the circumstances.
Lloyd Manufacturing Co. v. Davies, 51 N. D. 336, 199 N. W. 869, 36 A. L. R.
465 (1924).
"Tomlin v. Thorton, 99 Ga. 585, 27 S.E. 147 (1896) ; Empire Arizona Copiper Co. v. Shaw, 20 Ariz. 471, 181 Pac. 464 (1919) ; Gordon v. Levine, supra
note 2; Sinclair Refining Co. v. KXith, 97 Okla. 55, 221 Pac. 1003 (1924). But
if the facts are undisp~uted, or are such that no reasonable man could differ
concerning them, it.bcdomes a question of law for the court. Bristline v. Bentling, .rpranote 9; Nuzum v. Shepard, supra note 5.
"Cook v. Moecher, 217 I!.App. 479- (1920) ; Stull v. Daniel Machine Co.,
207 Ala. 544, 93 So. 583" (1923.); Jones v. Bank of Powder Springs, 31 Ga.
App. 263, 120 S.E. 422 (1923). Of 6ourse in North Carolina since we do not
have a directed verdict for the 'one sustaining the burden of proof the judge
would merely charge the jury that if they believed the evidence that they might
find for the plaintiff.
" Hazard Bank -and- Trust Co. v. Morgan, 211 Ky. 137, 277' S. W. 307
(1925); Bodner v.Rodman, supra note 12; Coldwell v. Coldwell, supra note
7: Gordon v. Levine, supra note 2.
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issue we find a split of authority. 17 Georgia and other jurisdictions,

require the defendant to go further and prove that the delay caused
him loss.' 8 Another group place the burden upon the drawer to prove
loss unless it is shown that the drawee bank has become insolvent, in
which event they recognize a prima fade case of loss, thus forcing
the holder to negative that loss in order to recover.' 9 A third group
merely require that the drawer prove unreasonable delay, and this
being done the holder must come forward and negative the loss to the
20
drawer or suffer an adverse verdict.

But it seems in theory at least that the two latter groups are in
error. The more equitable result would be reached by having the

drawer sustain the burden of proving both the unreasonable delay and
also the loss. Where no failure of the bank is shown the mere proof

of non presentation of the check within a reasonable time does not
raise any natural inference that a final loss has been or will be, suffered by the drawer. 21 And where we have the insolvency of the

drawee bank shown, while this may cause a natural inference of some
loss to the drawer, still it does not cause a natural inference of total
loss. 22 And since the drawer is only discharged to the extent of his.
,' It is commonly stated that the weight of authority places the burden of
disproving loss to the drawer on the holder in order for the holder to recover
after delayed presentment and failure of the drawee bank is shown, but if such
is the truth it exists by an exceedingly narrow margin.
However, all agree that loss to the drawer must be shown in some manner
and it is no defense that there has been loss without delay, or delay without
loss. It has been held that no delay short of the statute of limitations wilt
discharge the drawer without loss. Coldwell v. Coldwell, upra note 7; Harzard Bank and Trust Co. v. Morgan, supra note 6.
'Merritt v. Gate City Nat'l Bank, supra note 6; Rosenbaum v. Hazard, 23
Pa. 206, 82 Ati. 62 (1911) ; Sims v. Hunter, 258 Pac. 550 (Idaho 1927) ; Empire Arizona Copper Co. v. Shaw, supra note 14; Cox v. Citizens State Bank,
73 Kan. 789, 85 Pac. 762 (1906). Anchor Duck Mills v. Harp, 150 S. E. 57Z
(Ga. App. 1929). For case where action is brought on the original consideration instead of the check see McEwen v. Cobb, 104 Misc. Rep. 477, 172 N. Y.
S.44 (1914).
"Willetts v. Paine, 43 Ill. 433 (1867) ; Watt v. Gans, 114 Ala. 264; 21 So.
1011 (1897) ; Hamlin v. Simpson, 75 Iowa 125, 74 N. W. 906 (1898) ; Little v.
Phenix Bank, 2 Hill 425 (N. Y. 1842) ; Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, supra note 5.
" Griffin v. Kemp, 46 Ind. 172; McLain v. Lowther, 35 W. Va. 297, 13 S. E.
1003 (1892).
Indeed he may be financially benefited in case of an account which draws
interest on average daily balances.
" In the case of 105 insolvent national banks whose affairs were wound up
in the year ending October 31, 1929, dividends paid to the creditors ranged
from only one per cent to 111.5 per cent (principal and interest). The receiverships lasted from one to seven years. REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CuManNcY (1929) 26-27.
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loss, it seems more reasonable that one seeking to apply a statute
favorable to his cause should sustain the burden of proving that loss.
Manner of Proving Loss by Delay
But regardless of who sustains the burden of proof on the question of loss there still remains the problem as to the manner of determining its extent. At the date of the trial no one knows accurately
what it will be, since these actions are usually brought just after the
failure of the bank and it may not be known for several years what
will be paid, though the receiver may give an opinion. 28 Most cases
have ignored the question as to the extent of the loss entirely and
seem to have assumed that if loss could be shown at all it would be
presumed to be total. 24 In the few cases deciding the point the rule
has been to leave the question to the jury to determine the loss, without any adequate evidence to aid them, and their verdicts seem to
have been only a guess.2 5 This is in part the fault of counsel but
since the difficulty inheres in the nature of the case some other
method of dealing with check-loss cases might be suggested.
1. The case might be tried only to the extent of determining
whether the delay was or was not unreasonable, and if it was found
that the delay was unreasonable, the case might then be continued
until liquidation was complete, thus removing the necessity of a jury
verdict on the question of loss. 20
2. Judgment might be given for the holder for the whole amount
of the check with a stay of execution allowing the drawer to satisfy
the judgment by paying over to the holder whatever amount he should
later receive on this portion of his deposit in the liquidation pro27

ceedings.

Supra note 22.

"Hamlin v. Simpson, srupra note 19; C;mpbell v. Shark, 267 Pac. 458
(Idaho 1926); Kling Bros. v. Whipps, 123 Okla. 253, 270 Pac. 79 (1927);
Commercial Investment Co. v.Lundgren-Witternsten Co., 173 Minn. 83, 216
N. W. 531 (1928) ; Northern Lumber Co.v.Clausen, 201 Iowa 701, 208 N. W.
72 (1926).
Courtney v.McCartney, 30 Mo.183 (1865) ; Fergus Motor Co. v.Blackweilder, 260 Pac. 734 (Idaho 1926) ; see also Merritt v.Gate City Nat'l Bank,
supra note 6; Hamlin v.Simpson, supra note 19.
'The objections to this plan lieinthe fact that this will necessitate the
drawer giving a bond to reimburse the holder at the later date and itwould
involve also the question of whether the holder could be constitutionally deprived of his right to have the jury assess the damages at once,ifhe so desired.
' This arrangement too would require a bond ifthe plaintiff were properly
protected, and the premium on such bonds whether assessed on plaintiff or
dependent would seem to -bean undesirable expense of the adjustment between
the parties.
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3. The court might render judgment for the holder for the whole
amount of the check with leave to the drawer to satisfy it -by assigning to the holder a portion of his deposit claim against the drawee
bank equal to the amount of the check which has been dishonored.
By this plan the case would be finally disposed of at once, and the
amount of the plaintiff's recovery would be determined with mathematical accuracy. The loss which the plaintiff stood to suffer would
be the exact amount intended by the Negotiable Instruments Law.
And as the rule would have all the merits of speed and simplicity, it
would seem a desirable substitute for jury guesses. The innovation
23
might be put in force by a statute.
HENRY

T. POWELL.

Carriers-Allowance of Set-Off Against Freight Charges
A shipper, sued for freight charges, attempted to set off damages
arising from negligence and delay in shipment. A federal District
Court held that he was not entitled to plead set-off.1
Defendant shipped grapes over plaintiff's line. Plaintiff delivered
without collecting freight and brought suit for the charges. Defendant set up loss due to delay and negligent handling and asked for a
set-off which was allowed by the United States Supreme Court.2
The problem might be solved by an amendment adding the following to

§186 of the N. I. L.: "Provided, however, that when such check is found not
to have been presented within a reasonable time, and the drawer had the right

at the time of presentment, as between himself and the drawee, to have the
check paid, the drawer shall be entitled to be fully discharged from liability
thereon -by assigning to the holder thereof the portion of his claim against
the drawee equal to the amount of the check."
This is somewhat similar to §74 of the English Bills of Exchange Act,
which after stating, in effect, §186 of the N. I. L., adds: "The holder of such
check as to which such drawer or person is discharged, shall be a creditor, in
lieu of such drawer or person, of such banker, to the extent of such discharge,
and entitled to recover the amount from him."
This result may possibly be reached without an enabling statute by judicial
decree at the time of trial. See Hawes v. Blackwell, 107 N. C. 196, 12 S. E. 245
(1890). However, constitutional objections might well be raised against such
procedure.
There might be some ground for extending the language of the amendment above proposed to include also domiciled demand notes. See Note (1930)

8 N. C. L. REv. 184.
'Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Carl & W. J. Piowaty, Inc., 36 F. (2d) 604 (N. D.
Ill. 1929).
1 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Lindell, 50 Sup. Ct. 200 (1930).
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These two cases, though representing opposing views, were decided only two months apart, the second being the first holding of the
Supreme Court upon the question. Both the district courts and the
various state courts have been nearly evenly divided in opinion.3 The
only decision 4 in a Circuit Court of Appeals forms the basis for the
adverse holding of the first case here considered. It is there maintained that to allow a set-off would controvert the intention of Congress as expressed in the Interstate Commerce Acts to enforce uniform collection and prevent discrimination. Congress has attempted
to destroy the practice of discriminating by means of rebates and
allowances of claims for damages. 5 One device used in granting such
rebates was for the shipper to file fictitious claims for damages. 6
Under the act of Congress a carrier cannot accept in payment for the
transportation of interstate commerce anything but cash. If the shipper be allowed to set off claims for damages, the court must undertake the impossible task of holding the carrier to diligence and good
faith in preparing and presenting its defense, in order to prevent the
granting and receiving of rebates by insidious agreement between the
parties. 7 So important is it that the collection of freight charges be
uniform and above suspicion of favoritism that it seems against public
policy to permit a counterclaim of this kind to be pleaded.8
The Supreme Court could not see that this manner of pleading
was any more subject to collusion than any other and upheld the
practicability of faster settlement of claims by the use of set-off and
counterclaim.
The act 9 prohibiting carriers from refunding any part of charges
does not prevent shipper from setting up counterclaim. 10 There is
nothing in the letter or the spirit of this chapter which prevents the
'Pennsylvania P_ Co. v. South Carolina Produce Ass'n., 25 F. (2d) 315 (E.
D. S. C. 1928).
"Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M., S. P. & P. R. Co., 36 F. (2d) 180
(C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
'Pennsylvania R. Co. v. South Carolina Produce Ass'n., supra note 3.
'Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. W. L. Hoopes & Sons, 233 Fed. 135 (S. D. Iowa,
1916).
' Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. William S. Stein Co., 233 Fed. 716 (D. Neb.
1915) ; Johnson-Browl" Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 239 Fed. 590 (S. D.
Ga. 1917).
8Supra note 6.
028 U. S. C. A. §724 (Conformity of federal procedure to that of state in
which district court is held) ; 49 U. S. C. A. §6 (7) forbidding carrier to refund in any manner any portion of charges does not prevent shipper setting up
loss recoverable under par. 20 (11) as counterclaim.
'0Supra note 2.
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shipper from setting off damages of shipment against freight
charges." If in an action by the carriers for charges, a shipper cannot counterclaim for a cause of action ordinarily pleadable as such,
then as a corollary, in an action by the shipper the carrier should not
be permitted to counterclaim. There is no ground for differentiating
or for treating suits by one wherein the other counterclaims as presumptively collusive.' 2 It must be assumed that, when litigants come
into a court, they are submitting a real controversy for settlement.' 2
Adjustments of demands by counterclaims rather than by independent
14
suit serves to avoid circuity of action and is encouraged by law.
Commendable economy and efficiency in judicial procedure would,
seem to justify the disposition of the entire related controversy in one
action.' 5
G. A. LONG.
Conflict of Laws-Death by Wrongful Act-Limitations on
Right of Action
Under the Florida laws, an action for damages for wrongful
death may be brought at any time within two years after the death
occurred.' The North Carolina wrongful death statute2 specifies that
the action must be brought within one year. More than one year, but
less than two years, after a cause of action accrued in Florida, suit
was instituted in North Carolina. Held, action barred.8
When common law actions are involved, the general rule is that
the law of the place governs the right, and the law of the forum
governs the remedy. 4 Since general statutes of limitation are procedural in nature, it follows that the limitation of common law actions is governed by the lex fori.5 Thus, if action is barred by the
statute of limitations of the forum, no action can be maintained
'Battle v. Atkinson, 9 Ga. App. 488, 71 S. E. 775 (1911) ; Pennsylvania R
Co. v. Bellinger, 101 Misc. Rep. 105, 166 N. Y. S.652 (1917).
'Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. E. C. Tecktonius Mfg. Co. 262 Fed. 715 (E.
D. Wis. 1920).
' Wells Fargo & Co. v. Cuneo, 241 Fed. 727 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
" North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S.
596, 615-616, 14 Sup. -Ct. 710, 715-716, 38 L. ed. 565 (1894).
"Payne, Director General v. Clark, 271 Fed. 525 (S.D. Cal. 1921).
'FLA. REV. GEN. STAT. (1920), §§4960-61, 2930 (6).
'N. C. CoNs. STAT. ANN. (1919), §160.
1Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N. C. 397, 151 S. E. 857 (1930).
"Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S.406, 23 L. ed. 245 (1875) ; 1 Woon,
LImITATioNs (4th ed. 1916) 62.

'McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 10 L. ed. 177 (1839) ; Patton v. Lumber
Co., 171 N. C. 837, 73 S.E. 167 (1916) ; Note (1900) 48 L. R. A. 625.
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though the action is not barred in the state in which the cause of
action arose. 6 Conversely, if an action is not barred by the lex7 fori,
it may be maintained though it is barred by the lex loci delicti.
The right of action for damages for wrongful death is unknown
to the common law. 8 When the statute which creates the right specifies the time in which action must be brought, this limitation is a condition annexed to the right,9 and, like other substantive matters, 10
is governed by the law of the place of the wrong. Consequently, no
state will allow recovery on the statute after the limitation has
elapsed." The same result has been reached, moreover, when the
limitation was not incorporated in the same statute which created the
cause of action for wrongful death, but was directed expressly to that
12
cause of action.
On the theory, that when such prescribed limitation has expired,
the cause of action is extinguished, recovery has been denied where
suit was brought after the time provided Iiy the lex loci delicti but
within the time required for bringing action on a similar cause of
'CoNFLIcr oF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) §631. See McCoy
v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 134 Mo. 622, 627, 114 S. W. 1124 (1909). But see
Note (1913) 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 687, 690.
' CONFLICt or LAWS REsTATEmENT, supra note 6, §632; O'Shields v. Ga. Pac.
Ry., 83 Ga. 621, 10 S. E. 268, 6 L. R. A. 152 (1889) ; Tarbell v. Grand Trunk

Ry. Co., 94 Vt. 449, 111 Atl. 567 (1920). But where title to a chattel has been
acquired by adverse possession under the law of the situs, the rights acquired
will be respected in another jurisdiction to Which the chattel has been subsequently removed, although the statute of limitations of the forum would not
have barred the original owner's action. Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, 6 L. ed.

495 (1826).

'It was not until the enactment, in 1876, of Lord Campbell's Act that recognition was given to the doctrine that "it is oftentimes right and expedient that
the wrongdoer in such cases should be answerable in damages" for the death so
caused by him. (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.)
'2 WHARToN, CONFLicT oF LAWS (3rd. ed. 1905) 1261; Taylor v. Cranberry
Iron Co., 94 N. C. 525 (1886) ; Hanie v. Penland, 193 N. C. 800, 138 S. E. 165
(1927). See also Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 46 S. Ct. 410, 70 L. ed. 813
(1926) (the time provision in a Federal Employers' Liability Act is substantive,
and the shorter period prescribed by a state limitation statute will not prevail).
"Wrongful death statutes usually specify the party who must bring suit.
See Notes (1926) 24 MicH. L. REv. 411; (1928) 37 YAL.E L. J. 666; (1923) 9
VA. L. REv. 567.
'The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 75 Sup. Ct. 140, 30 L. ed. 358 (1886);
Boyd v. Clark, 8 Fed. 849 (E. D. Mich. 1881); CoNFLICT oF LAWS RESTATEizENT, supra note 7, §433. See Note (1900) 48 L. R. A. 639.
' Negaubauer v. Gt. Northern Ry., 92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 620, 104 Am.
St. Rep. 674, 2 Ann. Cas. 150 (1900). See also, Brunswick Terminal Co. v.
National Bank, 99 Fed. 635, 48 L. R. A. 625 (C. C. A. 4th, 1900); Davis v.
Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 24 Sup. Ct. 692, 48 L. ed. 1067 (1904). But see Gregory
v. Sou. Pac. Co., 157 Fed. 113 (C. C. D. Ore. 1907) (Wrongful death statute
contained no limitation, and general limitation statutes of locus delicti made
no reference to this cause of action, held, lex fori will govern.); Munos v.
Southern Pac. Ry., 51 Fed. 188 (C. C. A. 5th, 1892).
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action arising within the forum.'8 But as to the reverse situation,
where suit is brought within the time provided by the lex loci delicti
but after the time required by the lex fori, the authorities are sharply
14
divided.
The determinative question in situations of this type is whether
the time limit contained in the siatute of the forum is, in reality, both
a statute of lfmitation and a condition annexed to the substantive
right.15 Minnesota has held that the limitation is substantive only
and, applying the general rule that the law of the state creating the
right governs, has allowed action on a foreign wrongful death statute
to be maintained even though the same action would have been barred
had the wrong occurred in the state of the forum. 10 There are Fed17
eral Court decisions in accord.
A contrary result was reached by the North Carolina court when
the question was fairly presented by the principal case. If the North
Carolina statute is substantive only, and not a statute of limitation, it
inevitably follows that the one year limit contained therein is intended to govern actions for wrongful deaths occurring in North
Carolina, and has no effect on admittedly, good, transitory' 8 causes
of action arising in other states and brought to the forum for trial.
However, the declaration of the court that the time limit in the statute
is both a condition annexed to the cause of action and a legislative
declaration of the policy of the state as to when wrongful death
actions shall be asserted in the state, is sound, is in accord with the
suggestion made in the American Law Institute's Restatement of
Conflict of Laws,' 9 and will doubtless point the way for other decisions in this disputed area of the law.
THOMAS W. SPRINKLE.

"Wingert v. Carpenter, 101 Mich. 395, 59 N. W. 662 (1894); Ry. Co. v.
Lacy,
49 Ga. 107 (1873).
142 WHARTON, supra note 9, 1264.
"See

GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1927) 171.

" Negaubauer v. Gt. Northern Ry Co., supra note 12.
" Keep v. National Tube Co., 154 Fed. 121 (D. N. D. 1907); Theroux v,
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 64 Fed. 84 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894)
'Dennick v. Railroad, 103 U. S. 11, 26 L. ed. 439 (1880); Harrell v.
South Carolina, etc. R. Co., 132 N. C. 655, 44 S. E. 109 (1903). But see
McLay v. Slade, 48 R. I. 357, 138 Atl. 212 (1927), Noted (1927) 26 MICH.
L. REv. 325. (When the death statute is penal, there can be no recovery in
another state.)
CoNtLiCr OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) §433, comment

(b), "The limit of time in the death statute of the forum may be interpreted
as a statute of limitations for actions for death; and in that case the suit
must be brought within the time limited in that statute, as well as within the
time limited in the statute of -the place of injury."
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Constitutional Law-Public Utilities-Separate and. Equal
Accommodations in Motor Busses
In a recent North Carolina case 1 the Interracial Commission petitioned the Corporation Commission to make regulations to insure
the negro traveling public separate but equal accommodations on the
busses and in the passenger stations of the respondent bus companies
The petition was dismissed by the Corporation Commission on the
ground that it had no power to interpret carriers by -bus to be common carriers within the terms of the 1927 statute. 2 On appeal to the
Supreme Court it was held, (1) That bus lines operating within the
state are common carriers, and (2) That the Corporation Commission
has plenary power under the 1927 statute to require bus lines operating between points within the state in carrying passengers for hire to
provide separate bus and station accommodations for white and negro
passengers. 3
The legislature has authority to provide reasonable rules and regulations for the supervision of common carriers and to prevent unjust
discriminations and preferences. 4 This authority may be delegated
to an administrative board or commission. 5 The Corporation Commission is specifically vested by the 1927 statute6 with power to
'Corporation Commission v. Interracial Commission, 198 N. C. 317, 151
S. E.The
648 Corporation
(1930).
Commission was petitioned to make such regulations by
virtue of §7, chapter 136, Public Laws 1927, which provides, "The Commission
is hereby vested with power and authority to supervise and regulate every motor
vehicle carrier under this article; to make or approve the rates, fares, charges,
classifications, rules and regulations for sdrvice and safety of operation and
checking of baggage of each such motor vehicle carrier; to supervise the
operation of union passenger stations in any manner necessary to promote
harmony among the operators and efficiency of service to the traveling public;
...to require the increase of equipment capacity to meet public convenience
and necessity; and to supervise and regulate motor vehicle carriers in all other
matters affecting the relationship between such carriers and the traveling and
shipping public. The Commission shall have power and authority, by general
order or otherwise, to prescribe rules and regulations applicable to any and all
motor vehicle carriers. . . ." N. C. Code Ann. (Michie 1927) §2613 (p).
' Since this case the Corporation Commission has notified certain bus lines
to make arrangements to provide separate, but equal accommodations, for
whites and negroes in passenger stations. See Greensboro (N. C.) Daily
News, April 30, 1930, page 1, col. 2.
"Richmond & Danville R. R. Co. v. The Durham & Northern R. R. Co.,
104 N. C. 658, 673, 10 S. E. 659 (1889) ; The Atlantic Express Co. v. The Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 111 N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393, 18 L. R. A. 393, 32 Am.
St. Rep. 805 (1892) ; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S.
155, 24 L. ed. 94 (1876).
'The Atlantic Express Co. v. The Wilmington & Weldon R. R., supra
note 4.
'Supra note 2.
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supervise and regulate motor vehicle carriers in matters affecting the
relationship between such carriers and the traveling public: It seems
clear from the language of this statute, 7 without necessity of construction by the Corporation Commission, that the motor vehicle carriers provided for were common carriers. In accord with the policy
of the state with regard to separation of races in public conveyances, 8
the Commission should have issued orders for segregation upon the
petition of the Interracial Commission.
Since the above litigation began, chapter 216, Public Laws of
19299 has gone into effect, but not being necessarily involved in the
case was not thereby construed, although the Court discussed it.1O
The statute provides "that operators of motor vehicles or bus lines
or taxicabs engaged in the transportation of passengers of one race
only shall not be required to provide any accommodations for the
other race." A state statute which requires the separation of the
races, with equal accommodations, is not a denial of equal protection
of the laws.1 1 But no one can be excluded by a common carrier on
account of color,' 2 and a state law which authorizes race discrimina'The definition of terms provided by the same act defines, "the term 'motor
vehicle carrier' means every corporation or person * * * owning, controlling,
operating: or managing any motor vehicle used in the business of transporting
persons or property for compensation between cities, or between towns, or
between cities and towns over the public highways of the state as public highways are defined herein." Also "the term 'service' means that motor vehicle
service which is held out to the public and of which the public may avail itself
at will for transportation over the public highways * * * irrespective of
whether the service is on regular schedule or otherwise." Section 1, Chapter
136, Public Laws 1927; N. C. Code Ann. (Michie 1927) §2613 (j).
' "The policy of the legislative branch of the government is to have separation of the races-in the railroads, street cars, schools, public institutions, etc.,
of the state-with equal accommodations." State v. Williams, 186 N. C. 627,
634, 120 S.E. 224 (1923).
'N. C. Code Ann. (Michie 1929 Supp.) §2613 (p), amending §7, Chapter
136, Public Laws 1927, and N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §§3494, 3497.
" The Court said of the 1929 statute, "We think this act also authorizes
the Corporation Commission to work out in good faith the manner and method
left to the sound discretion of the Commission-a sane and sensible solution
giving adequate and equal accommodation to the white and negro races, taking
into consideration all matters including economical conditions relative to a
workable solution." Corporation Commission v. Interracial Commission, supra
note 1, at p..320.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. ed. 256 (1896);
Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U. S.71, 30 Sup. Ct. 667, 54 L. ed.
936 (1910).
' Coger v. North West Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145 (1873) ; Meisner v.
Detroit, B. I. &_W. Ferry Co., 154 Mich. 545, 118 N. W. 14, 129 Am. St. Rep.
493 (1908) ; West Chester & Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 93
Am. Dec. 744 (1867). "The law imposes on the carrier the duty of transporting every citizen paying the fare demanded. This right of the citizen and duty
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tion by a public carrier of passengers is unconstitutional. 13 It is submitted therefore that the portion of the 1929 statute above set out is
contrary to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend14
-ment.
The statute also provides "that nothing contained in this act or the
law amended hereby shall be construed to declare operators of busses
:and/or taxicabs common carriers." This provision appears to be
superfluous. Whether a carrier is private or public depends upon the
service it renders and not on legislation.1 5 Whether the service ren-dered is public or private depends on the facts, and the fourteenth
amendment prevents the legislature from declaring a carrier private
or public unless there is a reasonable basis of fact for so doing.'

A. W. GirOLsoN, JR.
Contracts-Consideration-Family Settlement
The testator, in disposing of his property among his children,
-made special bequests to two of his daughters, in recognition of their
love and attention to himself and their mother. From statements
-made by the eldest son, an executor under the will, the children drew
the inference that the two daughters had, and would enforce, a valid
claim for wages against the estate, unless they were paid. To avoid
litigation an agreement was drawn up, and signed and sealed by the
children, whereby the two daughters were to receive $1,500 each in
addition to the special bequests provided in the will and the unsigned
and undated codicil. The children now seek to have the agreement
set aside on the ground of lack of consideration. Held, that a court
of equity looks with favor upon family settlements, and if asserted in
of the carrier exists by common law."

U. S.v.Dodge, Fed. Cas. No. 14,976

(W. D. Texas 1877).

"McCabe v.Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 35 Sup.

Ct. 69, 59 L.ed. 169 (1914).
'See (1929) 7 N. C.L.Rv.391-392.

"Waldum v.Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Ry. Co., 169 Wis. 137,
170 N. W. 729 (1919) ; State v.Public Service Com., 117 Wash. 453, 201 Pac.
765 (1921) ; Pacific Spruce Corp. v.McCoy,294 Fed. 711 (D.C.Ore. 1923) ;
Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Dist. of Col., 241 U. S. 252, 36 Sup: Ct. 583, 60

L.ed. 984, Ann. Cas. 1916 D 765 (1916).
"Frost v.R.R. Com.of Cal., 271 U. S.583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L.ed. 1101
(1926); Michigan Public Utilities Com. v.Duke, 266 U. S.570, 45 Sup. Ct.
191, 69 L. ed. 445, 36 A. L. R. 1105 (1925). The state may declare a corporation a common carrier upon the application of the corporation, Corporation Commission v. Atl. Coast Line R. R. Co., 187 N. C. 424, 121 S. E. 767

(1924).
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good faith, even though in fact unfounded, will sustain them as basef
on valid consideration.'
This case is sustainable regardless of consideration on the ground
that the contract was under seal. 2 Though equity requires a consideration, regardless of any seal, to enforce an agreementa it will not
set a sealed agreement aside because of lack of consideration. The
4
case might also be sustained as a compromise of a doubtful claim
asserted in good faith. 5 But regardless of the seal and compromise,
the court's language was broad enough to indicate that the case would'
have been sustained on the ground of family settlement, even though
the court found no consideration.
By the great 'weight of authority a bona fide agreement by oneinterested in a testator's estate, to refrain from contesting a will is
valid. 6 It is not void as against public policy, since it lessens litigation.7 The giving up of such contest, begun in good faith or so,
intended, is sufficient consideration for a promise to pay money or
convey property.8
Consideration is in effect the price bargained for and paid for as.
the exchange for the promise.9 The necessity for consideration is the
result of a historical development.10 It is analogous to, but not
identical with the causa requirement under the Civil Law.1'
Its.
1

Weade v. Weade, 150 S. E. 238 (Va. 1929), commented on in (1930) 16

VA. L. Rav. 406.
'Harris v. McKay, 138 Va. 448, 122 S. E. 137, 32 A. L. R. 156 (1924).
'Lamprety v. Lamprety, 29 Minn. 151, 12 N. W. 514 (1882); Pound, Collsideration in Equity (1919) 13 ILL. L. REv. 667.
'1 WILLISTOrN, CONTRACTS (1924) §135 at 295.
"Cole v. Cole, 292 Ill. 154, 126 N. E. 752, 38 A. L. R. 719 (1920) ; Layer v.
Layer, 184 Mich. 663, 151 N. W. 759 (1915). Mere good faith alone is not
sufficient consideration, Hardin v. Hardin, 201 Ky. 310, 256 S. W. 417, 38
A. L. R. 756 (1923), and the claim compromised must not be frivolous or
unreasonable, Stellers v. Jones, 164 Ky. 458, 175 S. W. 1002 (1915) ; 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 296.

'In re Cook's Will, 244 N. Y. 63, 154 N. E. 823 (1926), 55 A. L. R. 806
(1928) ; Collins v. Collins, 151 Wash. 201, 275 Pac. 571 (1929). To the effect
that the contestant must have an interest in the property, see Conklin v.
Conklin, 165 Mich. 571, 131 N. W. 154 (1911).
'In re Cook's Will, supra note 6.
8
Hollowoa v. Buck, 174 Ark. 497, 296 S. W. 74 (1927) ; Blount v. Dillaway, 199 Mass. 330, 85 N. E. 477, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1036 (1908); Note
(1925) 38 A. L. R. 734, 740.
8 CONTRACTS RFSTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) §75.
102 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) Ch. 3.
' Causa is, in its proper meaning, the "reason" or "situation"

for doing
something; it has. through use, finally reached the point where it is very
intangible and hard to define or qualify, RADIN, RoMAx LAW (1927) 297-300.
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-present purpose seems to be to avoid litigation over trivial promises
not based upon any substantial motive.
The law still requires consideration. In its technical sense, as it
is generally thought of, it is something of value given in exchange;
this was the common law idea. It is, in its widest sense, the reason,
inotive or inducement, by which a person is moved to bind himself by
an agreement.12 But the conception of consideration is gradually
broadening and the courts are now enforcing promises, made without any value given for them, to pay debts which are barred by the
Statute of Limitations 3 or discharged in bankruptcy,1 4 as promises
to perform voidable duties.1 5 This same tendency is evidenced by
various other kinds of cases."' And the Uniform Written Obligations Act is a further example. Section 1 of the Act provides that a
written promise made and signed shall not be unenforceable for want
of consideration, if it contains a statement to the effect that the signor
intends to be legally bound.1 7 This seems to aim to carry out the
intention of the parties as evidenced by the instrument, even in the
absence of consideration.
The inflection; in the instant case, of the language of previous
cases' s clearly shows the broadening of the requirement of consideration in the law of contracts. This trend seems to lead to the logical
conclusion that future cases will support family settlements despite
want of consideration in the usual sense of legal detriment to the
promisee or benefit to the promisor.
MILLS ScoTT BENTON.

Corporations-Negligence of Directors-Right of
Corporate Creditor to Sue
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently held that plaintiffs,
corporation creditors, stated a good cause of action in a complaint
which charged the defendants, directors of a now insolvent corpor'SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE
' CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT,
" CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT,
' CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT,

(7th ed. 1924) 374.
supra note 9, §86.
supra note 9, §87.
supra note 9, §89.

"CONTRACTS

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 9, §§85-94.

'HANDBOOK

OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE COMMISSIONERS

ON UNIFORM

(1925) 584.
It is well settled that courts will go further to sustain family settlements

STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS

than they will under ordinary circumstances, Baas v. Zinke, 218 Mich. 502, 188

N. W. 512 (1922); Trigg v. Read,;5 Humph. 528, 42 Am. Dec. 447 (Tenn.
1845); Price v. Winston, 4 Munf. 63 (Va. 1813); 1 PAGE, CONTRACTS (1920)
§623; Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 734.
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ation with such negligence in the performance of their duties to the

corporation that a dishonest official was enabled to defraud plaintiffs
and others of large sums of money, and finally wreck the corporation
itself.'

Concerning the liability of corporate directors, the general American view is that they are agents of the corporation, and liable only
to it for their wrongful acts except under such circumstances as
would render them personally liable were they acting as agents of a

private individual.2 But some states have adopted the so-called "trust

fund doctrine" under which directors are liable as trustees of the
corporate assets for the benefit of stockholders and creditors. 3

There is likewise a split of opinion as to what conduct will render
directors liable either to the corporation or its creditors. Some jurisdictions hold that the director is liable only for gross negligence or
fraud ;4 the majority that he is liable for failure to exercise ordinary
care and diligence in the discharge of his duties ;5 and a few, that he
1
Minnis v. Sharpe, 198 N. C. 364, 151 S. E. 735 (1930).

'Allen v. Cochran, 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292, 50 A. L. R. 459 (1926);
Union National Bank v. Hill, 148 Mo. 380, 49 S. W. 1012 (1899) ; Killen v.
State Bank, 106 Wis. 546, 82 N. W. 536 (1900); Penney v. Bryant, 7 Nebr.
127, 96 N. W. 1033 (1903); Hart v. Evanson, 14 N. D. 570, 105 N. W. 942
(1895) ; Young v. Haviland, 215 Mass. 120, 102 N. E. 338 (1913) ; THoMPsox
on CORoroIONs (3rd ed.), §1276; FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS,
§2558; MEcHEm on AGENCY, §§1467, 1474.
'Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247, 12 N. E. 676 (1887); United Society of
Shakers v. Underwood, 9 Bush 609 (Ky. 1873); Nix v. Miller, 26 Colo. 203,
57 Pac. 1084 (1899); Hauser v. Tate, 85 N. C. 82 (1880); and Pender v.
Speight, 159 N. C. 612, 75 S. E. 851 (1912) (holding that the directors are
trustees for the creditors as well as for the corporation) ; McCollum v. Dollar,
213 S. W. 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (The directors of a corporation are
liable to its creditors for losses resulting from their negligent acts) ; Cameron v. First National Bank, 194 S. W. 469 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (A
creditor has an immediate right of action against the directors.)
"Cohen v. Maus, 297 Pa. 454, 147 Atl. 103 (1929); Hart v. Evanson,
supra note 2; Peck v. Cooper, 8 I1. App. 403 (1881); Utley v. Hill, 155 Mo.
App. 232, 49 L. R. A. 323 (1900) (Directors not liable though they could have
prevented the loss by exercise of reasonable care) ; Aubrey's Administrator v.
Stimson, 160 Ky. 563, 169 S. W. 991 (1914) ; Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, 10
Am. Rep. 684 (1872) (In the absence of fraud or misappropriation of funds,
or realization of a profit not common to all the stockholders directors are not
liable) ; FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CoarORATIoNs, §2573.
"Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C. 365, 29 S. E. 827 (1898); Anthony v.
Jeffress 172 N. C. 378, 90 S. E. 414 (1916) ; Braswell v. Morrow, 195 N. C.
127, 141 S. E. 489 (1928); Besselieu v. Brown, 177 N. C. 65, 97 S. E. 743
(1919) ; Moore v. Mason, 73 Ohio St. 275, 76 N. E. 932, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.)
597 (1906) (Directors are liable for failure to exercise ordinary care and
prudence); Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56

Pac. 353, 44 L. R. A. 508 (1899) (Directors are charged with reasonable care
in the performance of their duties) ; Conaty v. Torghen, 46 R. I. 350, 128 A.
338 (1925) ; General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 149 N. Y. S. 882 (1914) ; Mc-
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must use all he care and diligence that a prudent man would bring to
the management of his own business. 6 None, however, seems to hold
that he is liable for simple mismanagement or errors of judgment.7
North Carolina adheres to the "trust fund doctrine," and holds
directors to the care and diligence of ordinary prudent men. s Therefore it would seem that the defendants, by their demurrer, have admitted facts which would render them liable under the North Caro-

lina law. The remaining question is largely a matter of proper
parties to the suit.
Even in states holding the "trust fund doctrine" it is usual to
require that unless there has been a direct wrong to the complaining
creditor the right of action against the directors vests in the corporation, or in the receiver, for the benefit of all creditors similarly situated. 9 In case the receiver refuses to sue he may be made a party
defendant to the suit to the end that whatever is recovered by means
of such suit may be fairly distributed to all those having an equally
good cause of action. 10 Strong support for this position is found in
North Carolina cases. And it is submitted that a more equitable reEwen v. Kelly, 140 Ga. 720, 79 S. E. 777 (1913) ; Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S.

132, 35 L. ed. 662, 11 Sup. Ct. 924 (1891) (Directors must exercise ordinary
care in the discharge of their duties, and they will not be shielded from liability
because of the ignorance which is the result of gross inattention); Note.
(1919) 2 A. L. R. 867.
'Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 118 N. Y. S. 758 (1909); Hun
v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65 (1880) ; (1910) 8 MIcH. L. REv. 137.
' By "simple mismanagement" is apparently meant that which arises not
from carelessness, but solely as a result of non-negligent errors of judgment.
The consequences of such mismanagement have something of the element of
accident in them since they could hardly have been avoided by the exercise of
ordinary care and skill.
'Bane v. Powell, 192 N. C. 387, 135 S. E. 118(1926); Solomon v. Bates,
118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896) ; Caldwell v. Bates, 118 N. C. 323, 24 S. E.
481 (1896); Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482 (1896) ; Braswell v.
Morrow, supra note 5; Anthony v. Jeffress, supra note 5; Besselieu v. Brown,
supra note 5.
'Douglass v. Dawson, 190 N. C. 458, 130 S. E. 195 (1925); Ham v. Norwood, 196 N. C. 763, 147 S. E. 291 (1929); Bailey v. Mosher, 63 Fed. 488
(C. C. A. 8th, 1894) (Any liability of the directors is an asset in the hands
of the corporation, to be recovered by the receiver for the benefit of all the
creditors.) Priest v. White, 89 Mo. App. 609, 1 S. W. 361 (1886) (A wrong
done to the corporation which may affect its credit, and its creditors generally
is not a wrong to them as individuals, and they cannot maintain an action as
for tort); Kelly v. Dolan, 233 Fed. 635 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1916) (The right to
recover of the directors is a legal right vested in the corporation) ; Almiral
Co. v. M'Clement, 202 N. Y. S. 139 (1923); Lewis v. Council, 291 Fed. 148
(E. D., N. C. 1923); Allen v. Cochran, supra note 2; THoMPsoN, CoaPoRATIONS (3rd ed.) §1375.
"°Douglass v. Dawson, supra note 9; Ham v. Norwood, supra note 9;
Kelly v. Dolan, supra note 9; THOMPSON, CopoRA.rioxs (3rd ed.) 889.
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suit would have been reached in the present case by the application
of some such principle,
The wrong complained of was not one peculiar to the plaintiffs;
furthermore, there had been an intervention by a dishonest official,
an independent third party, between the negligence of the directors
and the injury complained of. If, as here, the individual creditor who
has been injured as a remote result of the defendant's negligence is
allowed to recover for an injury not peculiar to himself without joining the corporation, or its receiver, litigation will be increased with
the probable result that in such cases the aggressive creditors, and
those who are financially able to prosecute lawsuits will be enabled to
attach the available assets of the tort-feasors leaving the others to
such recovery as may be had from the corporate assets left in the

hands of the receiver.

ALLEN LANSTON.

Criminal Law-Prohibition-Purchase of Liquor
Officers found a quantity of liquor, something less than a gallon,
in the defendant's room which the defendant admitted having purchased for his own use. The defendant was indicted for transporting, purchasing, possessing, and having in possession for the purpose
of sale intoxicating liquor. Upon a verdict of "guilty of purchasing
liquor," the defendant appealed, contending that since the Volstead
Act does not prohibit the purchase of liquor and the Turlington Act1
was adopted to make the state law conform to the national law, the
State was limited in its power to legislate more stringently upon the
subject than Congress had done. Held, The state law prohibiting the
purchase of liquor for beverage purposes is not in conflict with the
federal law which does not prohibit purchase thereof. 2
The Eighteenth Amendment is not the source of power of states
to adopt and enforce prohibitory measures, but the power of the
states is that originally belonging to them and preserved to them
under the first ten amendments.s The concurrent power clause of
IN. C. Pub. Laws, 1923, c. 1, §2. "No person shall manufacture, sell, barter,
transport, import, export, deliver, furnish, purchase, or possess any intoxicating
liquors except as authorized in this act; and all provisions of this act shall be
liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage
shall be prevented." (Italics ours.) (An Act to Make the State Law Conform
to the National Law in Relation to Intoxicating Liquors.)
' State v. Lassiter, 198 N. C. 352, 1I S. E. 721 (1930).
'Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U. S. 403, 42 Sup. Ct. 330, 66 L. ed. 686
(1921) ; U. S. v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 43 Sup. Ct. 141, 67 L. ed. 314 (1922);
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 47 Sup. Ct. 103, 71 L. ed. 270 (1926).
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the Eighteenth Amendment negatived any inference that the amendment changed the source of police power of the states concerning intoxicating liquors or deprived them of that power, except in that it
prevented them from authorizing what federal law prohibited. 4 Each
state, as also Congress, may exercise independent judgment in selecting and shaping measures to enforce prohibition.0 State prohibitory
laws are in aid of and concurrent with the Eighteenth Amendment
and Volstead Act" and, unless repugnant to the purpose thereof, are
not invalid because more drastic in their nature. 7
It is a mooted question at present whether there is anything in the
Volstead Act making it a crime to purchase liquor. It has recently
been urged that a buyer can be prosecuted as an accessory of the
seller if the purchase involves transportation to the former,8 but this
contention had been overruled.2 The purchaser is not guilty of the
crime of aiding and abetting the crime of selling, and his co6peration
would seem to be insufficient to make him chargeable with conspiracy.10 Also the buyer's immunity is based on other grounds than
lack of co peration.11 The immunity which attaches to the victims
in certain offenses does not always protect such persons when prosecuted with conspiracy to commit the offenses in question.' 2 It would
' Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U. S. 350, 40 Sup. Ct. 486, 588, 64 L. ed. 946

(1921); Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 296, 128 N. E. 273, 10 A. L.
R. 1568 (1920) ; State v. Montgomery, 121 Wash. 617, 209 Pac. 1099 (1922);
Commonwealth v. Gardner, 297 Pa. 498, 147 Atl. 527 (1929).
' National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 40 Sup. Ct. 486, 64 L. ed. 946
(1919) ; U. S. v. Lanza, supra note 3.
'Rhode Island v. Palmer, smpra note 4; State v. Booher, 148 Wash. 149,
268 Pac. 167 (1928).
"Powell v. State, 98 Ala. App. 101, 90 So. 138 (1921); People v. Wood,
264 Pac. 298 (Cal. App. 1928); State v. Hammond, 188 N. C. 602, 125 S. E.
402, 404 (1924); State v. Barkesdale, 181 N. C. 621, 107 S. E. 505 (1921);
Youman v. Com., 193 Ky. 536, 237 S. W. 6 (1922); writ of error dismissed,
261 U. S. 625, 43 Sup. Ct. 358, 67 L. ed. 833 (1923).
'U. S. v. Kerper, 29 F. (2d) 744 (D. C. Pa. 1928).
'Norris v. U. S., 34 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929). Certiorari was
granted on March 3, 1930. See the U. S. Daily (March 4, 1930), page 1,
column 1.
"Singer v. U. S., 278 Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1922), certiorari denied, 258
U. S. 620, 42 Sup. Ct. 272, 66 L. ed. 795 (1922) ; Lott v. U. S., 205 Fed. 28, 29,
46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 409 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913); State v. Teahan, 50 Conn. 92
(1882).
" State v. Teahan, supra note 10 (the purchaser approaches the sale on the
wrong side) ; Commonwealth v. Willard, 39 Mass. 476 (1839) (the substantive
crime is too trivial to punish the abettor) ; Vannata v. U. S., 289 Fed. 424, 428
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1923) (statute in denouncing seller impliedly exempts the
buyer).
White Slave Act, see U. S. v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140, 35 Sup. Ct. 271, 59
L. ed. 504 (1914) ; Abortion, see Fixmer v. People, 153 Ill. 123, 38 N. E. 667
(1894) (decision under state statute).
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seem easier as a matter of policy to punish the buyer for conspiracy
to transport than to punish buying directly. Some courts in prosecuting for selling hold that the exemption of the purchaser does not
extend to his agent 12 and in disregard of actual facts twist the relati6nship into one of agency for the seller. 14 However, the general
rule is that the agent of the buyer is not guilty of selling provided he
has no interest in the liquor or the price and acts solely as the intermediary for the 'buyer and not in subterfuge to aid the seller. 15
The provisions of the National Prohibition Act and the Turlington Act are to be construed liberally to the end that the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage may be prevented. 16 To accomplish this
result the Turlington Act, which includes the word "purchase" in its
list of offenses, 17 would seem to be more effectively worded than the
national act. But the difficult problem raised by Prohibition has not
been inadequacy of statute but inability of enforcement. The instant
case raises an interesting query: Why have there been no cases in
the North Carolina Supreme Court for the purchase of liquor in the
seven years between the passage of the Turlington Act and the
present case? It may be that the -word "purchase" was inadvertently
included in the state act, the legislature giving it no special significance at the time, or that the courts have followed public opinion,
restricting punishment to the seller alone. As a matter of public
policy the benefits derived from logically convicting the buyer as well
as the seller of liquor may be more than counterbalanced by the risk
incurred of greater disregard for law.

TRAvis

BROWN.

'Buchanan v. State, 40 Okla, Cr. 645, 112 Pac. 32, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 83
(1910); State v. Gear, 72 Ore. 501, 143 Pac. 890 (1914); Walters v. State,
127 Miss. 324, 90 So. 76 (1921).
" Mo Yaen v. State, 18 Ariz. 491, 163 Pac. 135 (1917) ; Wigington v. U. S.,
296 Fed. 125 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924), certiorari denied, 264 U. S. 596, 44 Sup. Ct.
454, 68 L.ed. 867 (1924).
'Mitchell v. State, 148 Ala. 678, 41 So. 951 (1906) ; State v. Colonial Club,
154 N. C. 177, 69 S. E. 771, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 387 (1910) ; Cunningham y.
State, 105 Ga. 676, 31 S. E. 585 (1898); Lindsay v. State, 143 Ark. 140, 219

S. W. 1025 (1920).

"National Prohibition Act (27 U. S. C. A., 41 Stat. 305), c. 12, §2, "and
all provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that the
use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage may be prevented." These same
words are contained in the Turlington Act, supra note 1.

"rSee State v. Winston, 194 N. C. 243, 139 S. E. 240 (1927) ; State Y.
Hickey, 198 N. C. 45, 150 S. E. 615 (1929) (declaring the seller and purchaser
equally liable under the law).
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Criminal Law-Suspended Sentence-Banishment as Condition
The feme defendant, convicted in the Superior Court of violating
the prohibition laws, was sentenced to two years imprisonment, capias
to issue at the discretion of the solicitor, if at the end of sixty days
the defendant was found within the state. The defendant left the
state within the sixty days, but, four years after her conviction and
two years after her return to the state, on a motion of the solicitor,
while she awaited trial on another prohibition charge, the sentence
was ordered under the previous judgment. Both the judgment' and
the order 2 were affirmed on appeal.
It is suggested in a Tennessee decisions that the suspended sentence having developed in England as an aid to substantial justice in
lieu of criminal appeals, it is now properly employed only as an incident of procedure. An appellate court, however, cannot grant reprieve to a guilty prisoner, and trial courts have found this a desirable
4
method of meeting frequently occurring situations.
Definite probation systems have been adopted by thirty-three
states 5 in which the use of the suspended sentence is directed to the
end of achieving the reformation of certain offenders, but, in North
Carolina, due to the absence of any law6 regulating its use the trial
judge7 may use his own discretion as to whether the circumstances
'Except the provision that the capias was to issue at the discretion of the
solicitor, which was held to be without authority, the power to issue the capias
remaining in the court. State v. McAfee, 189 N. C. 320, 127 S. E. 204 (1925).
'State v. McAfee, 198 N. C. 507, 152 S. E. 391 (1930).
'A Tennessee court has no power to suspend sentence as a reformatory
measure. Spencer v. State, 125 Tenn. 64, 140 S. W. 597, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.)
680 (1911).
' Under extenuating circumstances, especially in the case of young and first
offenders, the interests of society and the offender are often best served not by
exacting the prescribed penalty, but by granting conditional freedom.
'In thirty-two states probation laws apply to both adults and children; in
fifteen states -there are juvenile probation laws only; Wyoming has only adult
probation. National Directory of Probation Officers, The National Probation
Ass'n (1928).
A Pennsylvania act of June 19, 1911, provides that a court may suspend
sentence when the prisoner has not been previously imprisoned, when his
character and the circumstances are such as to make a recurrence of the
offense unlikely, and when no duty to protect society is violated thereby, and
that a convict on probation may be dismissed when he has met the conditions.
The Report of the Crimes Survey Committee, The Law Ass'n of Philadelphia
(1926).
' Public policy would probably prohibit its use in the case of the graver
offenses.
'The sentence may be suspended by a Justice of the Peace, State v. Grims,
117 N. C. 709, 23 S. E. 164 (1895) ; a municipal judge, State v. Greer, 173
N. C. 759, 92 S. E. 147 (1917) ; or a recorder, State v. Tripp, 168 N. C. 150,
83 S.E. 630 (1914).
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warrant a reprieve,8 he may suspend sentence indefinitely, 9 and he
may impose conditions' o limited only by the court's conscience and
imagination. Although a sentence of banishment is void, a sentence
suspended on condition that the defendant leave the state and never
return has been upheld on the grounds that the exile was voluntary."1
By this reasoning it is obvious that any condition may be adjudged
legal, and the prisoner may be confronted with unusual and cruel
alternatives 12 to the prescribed punishment. It is further left to the
discretion of the court whether a given act amounts to a breach of
the condition,13 and, if so, whether the promised punishment will be
4
imposed.'
' There are no statutory regulations, and the circumstances under which the
reprieve was granted do not appear in the opinions of the Supreme Court, but
sentence has been suspended where offenders were guilty of assault with a
deadly weapon, State v. Hardin, 183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922) ; operating a disorderly house, State v. Hatley, 110 N. C. 522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892) ;,
libel, State v. Sanders, 153 N. C. 624, 69 S.E. 272 (1910) ; trespass to land;
State v. Griffis, supra note 7.
'The cases cited in note 8, supra, illustrate situations in which the sentence
may be executed whenever the conditions are breached (Some courts hold that
sentence may not be suspended indefinitely. Ex parte Bugg, 163 Mo. App. 44,
145 S.W. 831 [1912].), but the court sometimes stipulates a definite.period for
performance, as where the defendant was required to show for two years that
he had not violated the prohibition laws, State v. Greer, supra note 7.
10 Sentence is most frequently suspended on condition of good hehavior,
State v. Everett, 164 N. C. 399, 79 S.E. 274, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 848 (1913),
but sentences have been suspended on condition that the prisoner leave the
county and never return, Ex parte Hinson, 156 N. C. 250, 72 S. E. 310, 36
L. R. A. (N. S.) 352 (1911), that he pay the costs, State v. Griffis, supra note
7, that he pay the costs for himself and another, State v. Crook, 115 N. C.
760, 20 S.E. 513, 29 L. R. A. 260 (1894), that he keep the peace and not libel
certain persons, State v. Sanders, supra note 8, that he show compliance with
the prohibition laws for two years, State v. Greer, supranote 7. For comments
upon North Carolina cases, see (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 116 and (1928) 6 N. C.
L. R-v. 327.
' State v. Hatley, supra note 8. There would seem to be some doubt
whether leaving and remaining out of the state could be called strictly voluntary, when the only other course open to the prisoner is a term in jail. The
South Carolina court takes this view in State v. Baker, 58 S.C. 111, 36 S.E.
501 (1900), where imprisonment was to be for five years if the convict left
the state immediately thereafter, if riot Jor two additional years, the court
holding the condition involved perpetual banishment, and was therefore void:
A condition in a sentence that the offender leave the county was held void in
Hoggett v. State, 101 Miss. 269, 57 So. 811 (1912), but the Arkansas court
holds that a governor may pardon on such a condition, Ex parte Hawkins, 61
Ark., 321, 33 S.W. 106, 30 L. R. A. 736, 54 Am. St. Rep. 209 (1895).
"A suspended sentence is not an alternative judgment, State v. Hatley,
supra note 8, but it does offer a practical alternative to the prisoner.
':State v. Hoggard, 180 N. C. 678, 103 S.E. 891 (1920).
" In State v. Sanders, supra note 8, the court remarks on the fact that
capias did not issue on an unequivocal breach of condition, and in the instant
case the defendant operated a shop a few blocks from the court house for two
years in open violation of the condition that she remain out of the state.
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The Supreme Court, while recognizing the legality of suspending
sentence, has not commended the practice, 15 but has indicated that
evils would result from its indiscriminate use.16 With the law governing the suspended sentence in its present state there is no assurance
either to the community or to the convicted that under given circumstances sentence will be suspended, or on what conditions, or for what
period, or that on a breach of condition the offender will be disciplined. The instant case suggests the need of a definite system of
regulations designed to carry out the purpose of the suspended sentence, and to minimize the likelihood of its abuse.

W. T. COVINGTON, JR.
Damages-Carriers-Measure of Damages for Loss of Small
Part of Shipment in Bulk
In a recent case the facts showed that the plaintiff purchased a
carload of coal, while in transit. On arrival at destination there was
a shortage of 5,500 pounds. At the time of arrival, plaintiff had not
sold any of the coal. The shortage did not interfere with the maintenance of his usual stock, and no sales were lost as a result of it.
The plaintiff did not go into the retail market to replace the shortage.
Held, that the measure of damages was the wholesale price.1
It is the avowed aim of the courts in actions founded on contract
to place the party injured in as good position pecuniarily as he would
have occupied had the breach not occurred,2 and damages are
awarded, in the absence of special circumstances with this principle
in mind.
The pertinent statutory expression is found in the so-called Cummins Act 3 which provides that the holder of a bill of lading for interstate rail shipment is entitled to recover for the "full actual loss" to
his property. By jfudicial interpretation this has come to mean that
such loss is to be ascertained with reference to the value at point of
destination. 4
'

State v. Hatley, supra note 8.

"State v. Griffis, supra note 7; State v. Hilton, 151 N. C. 687, 65 S.E.

1011 (1909) ; State v. Everett, supra note .10.
'Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crail, 50 Sup. Ct. 180 (1930).
'Seaboard Air Line R. R. v. U. S., 261 U. S.299, 43 Sup. Ct. 354, 67 L. ed.

664 (1922).

'34 Stat. 593, 49 U. S. C. A. §20 (11).
"Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore

504, 64 L. ed. 801 (1919).

Co., 253 U. S.97, 40 Sup. Ct.
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Varying conceptions of "value" are to be encountered in the
decisions. In general the rule is that value must be determined with
reference to the quantity involved, and may not be determined with
reference to a larger quantity.6 This would seem to mean that if
goods are bought in large quantities, the market price at retail is not
the standard, but the market price at wholesale. 6
Conversely, when it is sought to ascertain the value of goods in
small quantities, or of a single chattel, (regardless, apparently, of the
fact that it may have been one of a large number of like chattels, e.g.,
the deliberate conversion of one article from the stock of a wholesale establishment) ordinarily the measure of damages is the retail
price.1
The trend of decision is toward holding that where the consignee
is under reasonable compulsion to re-purchase at retail rates to meet
outstanding demands, the measure of damages should be based on
retail rates.8 However, this case is clearly out of that category. To
allow the use of the latter standard would be to include all overhead
expense of marketing at retail, such as clerk hire, rent, and bad debts,
none of which had been incurred with regard to the shipment in
question.9
The present decision satisfies the common law principle of full
compensation for injuries received, at the same time bearing out the
'Bagley v. Findlay, 82 Ill. 524 (1876); James H. Rice Co. v. Penn Plate
Glass Co., 117 Ill.
App. 356 (1904); Grand Tower Co. v. Phillips, 90 U. S.

471, 23 L. ed. 71 (1874), in which it is declared that "the true rule would seem

to be to allow the plaintiffs to show the price they would have had to pay for
coal in the quantities which they were entitled to receive it under the contract."
Compare this statement from Heidritter Lumber Co. v. Central R. R. of N. J.,
100 N. J.L. 402, 122 Atl. 691 (1923), "the plaintiff was entitled to replace the

coal at its value at destination because the quantity that was lost could not be
-bought at wholesale rates anywhere." It did not appear in this case that the
plaintiff was compelled to -purchase in the retail market to meet outstanding

contract.
14 SUTHERLAND ON

DAMAGES (4th ed.) §1098, p. 4178; Wendnagel v.
Houston, 155 Ill. App. 664 (1910).
'1 SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES (9th ed.) §248a, p. 500; SUTHERLAND ON
DAMAGES, supra note 6. Compare: ". . . where part of a stock of goods is
converted, the value of the goods in the retail market is not the measure of
damages in an action of trover." Sedgwick, supra.
'Cobb v. Illinois C. R. Co., 39 Iowa 601 (1874); Bridgman v. The Emily,

18 Iowa 510 (1865); Kyle v. Laurens R. Co., 44 S. C. L. 382, 70 Am. Dec.
231 (1857).
' SUTHERLAND ON DAMAGES, supra note 6. See opinion of Cant, District
Judge, in Crail v. Illinois Cent. P. Co., 21 F. (2d) 836 (D. C. Minn. 1927).
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statutory requirement that awards are to be made for actual loss
suffered.1 0
T. J. GoLD, JR.
Mortgages-Tenancy in Common-Right to Improvements
In the case of Layton v. Byrd1 the defendant had purchased a
tract of land from three tenants in common, A, B, and C. The interests
of B and C were unencumbered, that of A was subject to a mortgage to T, unknown to the defendant. Defendant before foreclosure
by T, and after purchase from A, B, and C, made permanent improvements on the land. Plaintiff sub'sequently purchased the onethird undivided interest formerly owned by A at foreclosure sale
by T. In a bill for partition by plaintiff, Held, The rule entitling
the tenant in common to the value of his improvements on partition 2
is inapplicable, the rule that improvements made on mortgaged lands
by the mortgagor or one claiming under him inure to the benefit of
the mortgagee3 must be applied, and the plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate part of the improvements.
The court reaches its conclusion on the reasoning that, at the time
the improvements were put upon the land, there was no tenancy in
common in existence, but the land was held by Byrd, defendant, as
sole owner. Consequently, since there was no co-tenant against
whom he could assert his equity the tenant in common rule cannot
0

Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 23 L. ed. 374 (1875) ;
(1920) §1338. Several cases have recognized the

WMLISTON ON CONTRACTS

anomalous but equitable doctrine tthat occasionally the measure of damages
cannot be determined by reference to either the wholesale or retail price. See
Clark v. Parsons, 109 Mo. App. 432, 84 S. W. 1019 (1905). Thus in the United
States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, 43 Sup. Ct. 565, 67 L. ed.
1014 (1923) it was held that where coal was appropriated by the government,
and where there was a free market for export coal, and the coal could have
been sold in such market, the owner was entitled to the export price, although
this was higher than domestic rates.
1198 N. C. 466, 152 S. E. 161 (1930).
'If one tenant in common makes improvements on the common property
he will be entitled upon partition to the value of his share in the land in its
unimproved condition and the value of the improvements, if this can be done
without prejudice to his co-tenants. Pope v. Whitehead, 68 N. C. 191 (1873) ;
Collett v. Henderson, 80 N. C. 337 (1879) ; Fisher v. Toxaway Co., 171 N. C.
547, 88 S. E. 887 (1916) ; see Note (1919) 1 A. L. R. 1189; Bayley v. Nichols,
263 Ill. 116, 104 N. E. 1054 (1914); Crafts v. Crafts, 13 Gray 360 (Mass.
1859); Fenton x.. Miller, 116 Mich. 45, 72 Am. St. Rep. 502, 74 N. W. 384

(1898).

' Wharton v. Moore, 84 N. C. 479 (1881); Belvin v. Raleigh Paper Co.,
123 N. C. 138, 31 S. E. 655 (1898) ; see also Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 601.

470

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

be applied. The mortgage was a conveyance of the legal title to the
mortgagor's interest to T as security for the debt; the mortgagor to
all other purposes remained owner, and continued so until his conveyance to Byrd. By operation of the mortgage rule the lien of the
mortgage extends over one-third of the improvements.
A mortgage can convey no more to the mortgagee than an absolute conveyance can convey to the grantee. If A had deeded his interest in the land to T, the mortgagee, instead of making the mortgage, neither T nor his vendee could have obtained an interest in the
improvements, by application of the tenant in common rule. Does
it not follow, a fortiori, that T cannot obtain a benefit from the
mortgage which he could not have-obtained had he become absolute
owner of the A interest? It is interesting, as well, to note that Byrd,
by his purchase from A, B, and C was placed in a worse position
than had he merely purchased the interests of B and C. Clearly, had
A remained owner of his equity Byrd would have had a co-tenant
against whom the tenant in common rule could be applied, and an
indisputable claim to the whole of the improvements. In the instant
case he lost the A interest by foreclosure, together with one-third the
value of the improvements. It cannot be said that he was compensated by way of an increase in the value of the equity of redemption 4
in the A interest-the plaintiff bought without knowledge of the
improvements, and there was no surplus of purchase money to go to
Byrd.
If the improver himself had mortgaged the one-third undivided
interest, or had he assumed payment of the mortgage, other considerations than those present in the principal case might well justify
the court in holding as it did. However, the natural justice of the
situation seems heavily on the side of. the dhfendant-not only did
the plaintiff, to the extent of his knowledge, buy and pay for the A
interest in its unimproved condition, but, as well, Byrd made his
improvements in good faith without any actual notice of the existence of the mortgage. The cases cited in the opinion in support of
the mortgage rule 5 refer without exception to situations where the
'It has been argued in support of the mortgage rule that it not only adds
to the value of the mortgagee's security, but also it increases the value of the
mortgagor's equity, Butler v. Page, 7 Metc. 40 (Mass. 1843).
"Martin v. Beatty, 54 Ill. 100 (1870); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Huntington, 57 Kan. 744, 48 S. W. 19 (1897) ; Rice v. Dewy, 54 Barb. 455 (N. Y.
1862) ; Gibson v. American Loan and Trust Co., 58 Hun. 443, 12 N. Y. S. 444
(1890) ; Childs v. Dolan, 5 Allen 319 (Mass. 1862) ; Ivey v. Yancey, 129 Mo.
501, 31 S. W. 937 (1895).
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mortgage wholly covers the mortgaged land, as distinguished from a
mortgage of an undivided interest. The only case in point, 6 not
cited by court or counsel in the Layton case, reaches a contrary result, applying the tenant in common rule denying the mortgagee's
assignees the right to share in the improvements, and logic at least
seems to support that holding. If A, the mortgagor, had retained
his equitable title, as co-tenant he could not have shared in the improvements on partition, nor could T as mortgagee claiming under
him. 7 Should the fact that the improver has purchased the interest
of A increase the rights of the mortgagee? Could it not be strongly
argued that there was a tenancy in common at the time the improvements were made? Since undeniably T was a legal tenant in common by virtue of his holding legal title, it seems that the tenant in
common rule could be applied as against T.

J. G. ADAMS,

JR.

Municipal Corporations-County Bonds-Effect of Thirty Day
Limitation on Validity of Bond. Ordinance
The County Finance Act of North Carolina provides, among
other things, that "... no order shall be passed (by any county)
for the issuance of bonds other than school bonds unless it appears
from said sworn statement (order) that the net indebtedness for
other than school purposes does not exceed five per cent of said
assessed valuation (of the county). . . ."1 Itfurther prov'ides, that
the validity of a bond order shall not "be open to question in any
court upon any ground whatsoever," unless the proceeding shall be
commenced "within thirty days after the first publication of notice"
of the bond order.2 In Kirby v. Board of Commissioners of Person
County,3 a bond ordinance was adopted by the board of commissioners authorizing the issuance of bonds for court house and jail purposes. The amount of this bond order raised the total indebtedness
of Person County above five per cent of its assessed valuation. Some
ninety days after notice of the bond order had been published, the
' The defendant purchased all the shares of several co-tenants in land and

erected improvements believing himself to be sole owner. The plaintiffs,
assignees of the holder of a prior mortgage on the share of one co-tenant, sue
to foreclose. Annely v. DeSaussure, 17 S: C. 394 (1881).

'Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 621; Annely v. DeSaussure, supra note 6.
'N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (17).
'N.
C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (20).
3
Y98 N. C.440, 152 S. E. 165 (1930).
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plaintiff instituted an action to restrain the commissioners of said
county "from proceeding further in the issuing and sale of said court
house a=d jail bonds and from levying said tax," because the issue
exceeded the five per cent limitation. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that "after the lapse of thirty days, if no suit had been
instituted, the bond ordinance is deemed to be valid for all purposes."
The broad language of this thirty day statute of limitation raises the
question whether it extends to every defect which might possiblyj
occur in the issuance of bonds under the Finance Act.
One of the main objects of the Finance Act was to raise the
credit standing of the counties by creating a uniform system of issuing bonds and other instruments for obtaining money and of providing the means of paying therefor. The statute of limitation was
insertefl in the Act for the purpose of insuring the ready marketability of county bonds by precluding any attack upon the validity
of the bonds after thirty days from publication of notice of bond
orders.4 It is doubted, however, if the curative effect of this provision is as broad as its language would seem to indicate, namely, that
a bond order shall not "be open to question in any court upon any
ground whatsoever" after thirty days from publication of notice.
For, although the failure to attack a bond order within the prescribed period would admittedly validate the bond issue as to any
statutory defects, 5 it ought not to apply to constitutional defects.
"The County Finance Act and the County Fiscal Control Act were both
passed in 1927, at which time the financial status of several of the counties
was deplorable. County debts were growing larger year by year and from
administration to administration. Consequently, their credit standing was lowered. Also, these debts.had to be paid. The Finance Act in providing for the
funding and refunding of county debts remedied the situation as it then existed. The Fiscal Control Act, in requiring a yearly budget by each county
of its expenditures, sought to prevent a recurrence of county deficits as existed
prior to 1927.
The Finance Act, after setting forth certain purposes for which bonds may
be issued, provides, in general, the following procedure which a county must
comply with in issuing bonds: (1) The county commissioners must first introduce a res6lution to issue bonds. This is known as an "order," and it cannot
be passed at the meeting at which it is introduced. (2) This order shall state:
(a) the purpose for which the bonds are to be issued; (b) the amount of the
bonds; (c) that a tax sufficient to pay off these bonds, when due, shall be
annually levied and collected; (d) that a statement of the county debt has
been filed with the clerk, and is open to public inspection; (e) "and a clause
stating the conditions upon which the order will become effective, and the same
shall become effective in accordance with such clause, which clause shall be as
follows:" [see N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (9)].
'The General Assembly of North Carolina has the power over and control
of taxation in the state (Art. II, §14, Const. of N. C.), thus, the Assembly
may provide, in any way it deems wise, for the issuance of bonds by counties
and prescribe the conditions upon which they shall become effective-so long
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That is to say, the failure of the order to comply with any constitutional provision might be urged in attacking the validity of the
bonds, at any time. For example, where the authority to issue bonds
is not given in accordance with the constitutional provision, or where
bonds are issued for other than necessary purposes, a vote of a
majority of all the registered voters is required by the Constitution.8
The Finance Act, in compliance with the Constitution, requires that
"if the bonds are for a purpose other than the payment of necessary
expenses, . ..the order shall take effect when approved by the
voters of the county. . . .,,7 Suppose then, that a bond order stated
that the bonds were to be issued for a necessary purpose, and was
therefore not submitted to a vote of the people, when, in fact, the
purpose for which they were issued was not a necessary one at all.
To validate the bonds in the face of such a defect by holding that
"after the lapse of thirty days, if no suit had been instituted, the
bond ordinance is deemed to be valid for all purposes," would be to
uphold a statutory enactment in direct contravention of a constitutional limitation. 8
It is conceded that in the instant case plaintiff's failure to object
within thirty days was fatal because the objection was based upon
a statutory defect. It is submitted, however, that when the .Supreme
Court is called upon to review an attack on a bond issue which is
based upon a failure to comply with some constitutional provision,
the thirty day statute of limitation, as provided for in the Finance
Act, will be held not to apply. It would seem that such a result was
contemplated by the legislature, for the Finance Act provides that
"every provision of this act shall be construed as being qualified by
constitutional provisions whenever such construction shall be necessary in order to sustain the constitutiohality of this act." 9

J. FRAZIER

GLENN, JR.

as such legislative action is in accordance with the constitutional limitations
(Art. VII, §7, Const. of N. C.). See, Com'rs v. Smuggs, 121 N. C. 394, 28
S. E. 539 (1897) ; Claybrook v. Com'rs, 114 N. C. 453, 19 S. E. 593 (1894).

'Const. of N.C.,Art. VII, §7.
'N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (9).

S "In the absence of special
constitutional restriction, the legislature may
confer ,the taxing power upon municipalities in such measure as it deems expedient-in other words, with such limitations as it sees fit, as to the rate of
taxation, the public purposes for which it is authorized, and the objects (thepersons, business and property) which shall be"subjected to taxation; but it
cannot, of course, confer greater power than the state itself possesses, and it
must observe the restrictions and limitations of the organic law." DILLON,
MUNICiPAL CoRpoRATI6xs (5th ed.), §1376 (640); Ex parte Montgomery, 64Ala. 463 (1879).
'N. C. Code (Michie, 1927) §1334 (3).
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Real Property-Restrictive Covenants-Recorded Plat an
Implied Covenant
The owner of a tract of land divided it into streets and lots, the
latter having not less than one hundred feet frontage and being not
less than one-half acre in area. A map of the tract was recorded and
one lot was sold to each of the nine defendants. The deeds to these
lots referred to the plat; restrictive covenants were in the deeds but
no express covenant bound the grantor with respect to any other
lot. The grantor proposed to subdivide for sale the remaining eleven
lots. He brought this action, alleging a cloud upon his title, to determine the validity of defendants' claims that each had a right to
enjoin the proposed subdivision. Held: the vendees could not prevent the vendor from subdividing the remaining lots.'
The court decided that a recorded plat, incorporated by reference
into each of the defendants' deeds, did not establish a general improvement plan or scheme. Had it been determined that the plat
indicated such a general plan,2 then the grantor would have been
precluded from asserting the disputed right in regard to the land.'
What is necessary to establish a development plan? It is said that
whether or not restrictions appear in the deed is not conclusive that
lots are or are not sold pursuant to a general plan. 4 It has been
held that where there were restrictions in some of the deeds to the
grantees and none in others, in an action between two of the grantees,
that there was no uniform scheme of development.6 A recent decision held that where a tract of land was divided into blocks and
subdivided into lots, of which it does not appear that a plat was recorded, that it was not planned in accordance with a general development scheme.8 Further, the mere recordation of a plat imposes
'Stephens v. Binder, 198 N. C. 295, 151 S. E. 639 (1930). The case relied
upon by the court held that a map alone was insufficient to establish a general
plan, Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 127 S. E. 697 (1925). Accord: Clark
-v. McGee, 159 Ill. 518, 42 N. E. 965 (1896); Milliken v. Denny, 141 N. C.
224, 53 S. E. 867 (1906).
'Bowen v. Smith, 76 N. J. Eq. 456, 74 Atl. 675 (1909).
' Rives v. Dudley, 56 N . C. 126, 67 Am. Dec. 230 (1856).

'Velie v. Richardson, 126 Minn. 334, 148 N. W. 286 (1914) ; Hano v. Bigelow, 155 Mass. 341, 29 N. E. 628 (1892).
' Snyder v. Heath, 185 N. C. 362, 117 S. E. 294 (1923). A land development company purchased a large acreage of lands adjoining a city, had it
-platted into lots, recorded the plat, and sold various lots to purchasers, some
of whose deeds contained restrictions while others did not. Held: there was
no uniform scheme of development. Accord: Donahoe v. Turner, 204 Mass.
274, 90 N. E. 549 (1910).

'Delaney v. Hart, 198 N. C. 96, 150 S. E. 702 (1930).
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no duty on an owner of land to abide by it.7 However, upon the
specific facts of a case where reference was made in a deed to a recorded plat, it was said that the purchasers acquired the right to
rely upon the continued and unchanged existence of the plan as
indicated by the plat.8
It is said that the criterion in this class of cases is the intent of
the grantor,-whether he intends the act, relied upon as the basis of
the disputed implied easement, to inure to his own or to the benefit
of the lot owners generally; and his intention is to be gathered from
his acts and the attendant circumstances. 9 Now, as between grantees,
the right to enforce an easement must be based upon the theory that
each purchaser buying a lot with notice of something in the nature
of a general building plan, impliedly assents thereto, and may be
compelled to comply therewith at the suit of the owner of any other
lot.' 0
It is submitted that in the sale of half-acre lots located in an exclusive residential-estate district (as in the instant case) an inference
should arise that each vendee had paid an enhanced price for his
property, in reliance upon the continuance and enforcement of the
details of the recorded plat which is incorporated by reference into
his deed."
Would it not be good policy to estop the vendor, who
has induced the vendee to act in reliance upon the recorded plat,
from subsequently disregarding it ?12
C. E. H. REITZEL.
'Stephens Co. v. Homes Co., 181 N. C. 335, 107 S. E. 233 (1921). Where
a body of land was platted, the plat recorded, and the land mapped into blocks,
lots, and streets by several separate and distinct divisions, and lots sold with
reference to later sub-divisional recorded maps respectively, it was held that
the lots -were not sold according to a general building plan and that the original
recorded -plat raised no such implication. Accord: Webber v. Landrigan, 215
Mass. 221, 102 N. E. 460 (1913).
'Collins v. Land Co., 128 N. C. 563, 39 S. E. 21 (1901) ("A map or plat,
referred to in a deed, becomes a part of the deed, and the plan indicated orr
the plat is to be regarded as a unity, and the purchaser of a lot under it
acquires the right to rely upon its continued unchanged existence"). See also:
Conrad v. Land Co., 126 N. C. 776, 36 S. E. 282 (1900) ; Johnston v. Garrett,

190 N. C. 835, 130 S. E. 835 (1925).
'Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 N. E. 936 (1901).
" De Gray v. Monmouth Co., 50 N. J. Eq.329, 24 Atl. 388 (1892).
"Hughes v. Clark, 134 N. C. 457, 47 S. E. 462 (1904) ; De Gray v. Monmouth Co., supra note 11; Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N. W. 317'
(1911).
"Rives v. Dudley, supra note 3; Grogan v. Hayward, 4 Fed. 164 (1880)
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Real Property-Specific Performance-Interest of
Tenant by Curtesy Initiate
Has a tenant by the curtesy initiate sufficient interest in the wife's
land to support an action for specific performance, so far as his interest is concerned, under a contract of sale signed by said tenant
and his wife, where the wife's privy examination is not taken? The
Supreme Court of North Carolina thinks so.'

By constitutional 2 and statutory3 provisions North Carolina has
stripped the husband's curtesy right of its ordinary common law attributes. 4 Birth of issue alive capable of inheriting no longer gives
the husband a present estate in the wife's land.5 From the date of
marriage he has the right of joint occupancy8 with the wife, and
upon birth of issue becomes a tenant by the curtesy initiate, conferring the privileges of joint occupancy with the wife, of serving as
a tales juror, 7 and the possibility of gaining a freehold estate for
life if the wife predecease him, dying intestate, 8 and he has not forfeited his right.9 He has no vested interest 10 in the wife's realty,
no present estate, and although the principal case terms it a "valuable interest'l others have held it to merely constitute a veto
' Colwell v. O'Brien, 198 N. C. 228, 151 S. E. 190 (1930), dismissing a
petition to rehear from 196 N. C. 508, 146 S. E. 142 (1929).
'N. C. Const. Art. X, §6.
'N. C. Cons. Stat Ann. (1919) §2510.
"Thompson v. Wiggins, 109 N. C. 108, 14 S. E. 301 (1891), holding that a
tenant by the curtesy initiate could not maintain an action for rents due on
his wife's real estate, since the wife was the real party in interest.
Thompson v. Wiggins, supra note 4.
'Walker v. Long, 109 N. C. 510, 14 S.E. 299 (1891) (that wife may sue
alone in action involving her real property) ; Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 176 N. C.
182, 96 S.E. 988 (1918) ; Jones v. Coffey, 109 N. C. 515, 14 S.E. 84 (1891).
'Thompson v. Wiggins, supra note 4; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2519;
Hodgin v. R. R., 143 N. C. 92, 55 S.E. 413 (1906) ; Jackson v. Beard, 162 N. C.
105, 78 S.E. 6 (1913). But see Sipe v. Herman, 161 N. C. 107, 76 S.E. 556
<1912).
'Freeman v. Lide, 176 N. C. 434, 75 S.E. 936 (1918) ; Richardson v. Richardson, 150 N. C. 549, 64 S.E. 510 (1909) ; Tiddy v. Graves, 126 N. C. 620,
36 S.E. 127 (1900).
' N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §§2519, 2522 (divorce a vinculo and felonious slaying), 2524 (husband's living in adultery, etc., or divorce a mensa at
wife's suit), 2516 (release).
"0Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, supra note 6; Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N. C.
947, 44 S.E. 655 (1903) (not such a vested interest as to prevent abolishment
by subsequent laws-a mere expectancy or possibility of future acquisition is
not a vested right). Eames v. Armstrong, 146 N. C. 1, 59 S.E. 165 (1907)
(husband's attempted redemption of wife's land sold for taxes ineffective since
le had no interest therein).
' Colwell v. O'Brien, supra note 1.
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-power,12 the right "to come home,"'1 the right of ingress and egress
to the dwelling and society of the wife, with a "possibility of in1ieritance."' 4 However, the present court does not feel that deter-mination of the precise interest involved is necessary. 15
The principal case presents for the first time in North Carolina' 8
the question of whether the husband's modem-day estate by the
,curtesy initiate is of a sufficiently tangible nature to carry a monetary
value so far as third parties are concerned. The answer of the
North Carolina court not only establishes such monetary value, but
sees in it sufficient tangibility to permit of specific performance.
'Which presents the question of the rights of the wife in the face of
such a decree of specific performance.
Through the conveyance decreed by the court the purchaser succeeds to whatever rights the husband may ever have as tenant by
the curtesy consummate-and by it the husband renders ineffective
any subsequent joindure in his wife's deed to the property in question, so far as his interest therein is concerned. Hence, any subsequent purchaser from the wife, although the husband join in the
deed, takes subject to the outstanding rights of the holder of the
husband's deed to his curtesy right, should the wife die intestate
before the husband. This prevents the wife's disposal of her property at full market value, since her purchaser faces the possibility
of an intervening estate for the life of the surviving husband. Such
impairment of the wife's estate constitutes a cloud on title,'7 and
although placed there by judicial decree, such decree was aimed at
the husband and should not be allowed to prejudice the rights of
the wife in contravention of her constitutional privileges.' 8
'Dissenting opinion of Clark, C. J., in Jackson v. Beard, 162 N. C. 105, 111,
78 S. E. 6 (1913) ; Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, supra note 6.
Manning v. Manning, 79 N. C. 293 (1878) ; State v. Jones, 132 N. C. 1043,
43 S. E. 939 (1903), refusing to allow trespass by wife against husband for
coming on her lands against her orders, since such would constitute judicial
separation by the criminal action of trespass. Clark, C. J., dissents, and
would have allowed trespass.
1'Dissenting opinion of Clark, C. J., in Jackson v. Beard, supra note 12;
Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, supra note 6.
"To quote from the decision: "But without regard to the precise interest
which a tenant by the curtesy initiate may have.. ..
"No decisions dealing with the same matter have been found in any states
under modern statutes similar to those of North Carolina. An analogy to
common law curtesy right would not be pertinent.
' N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1743 and annotations, dealing with quieting of titles.
" N. C. Const., Art. X, §6.
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Nor is there simply a substitution of personalities whereby the
wife now has to secure the signature of the husband's purchaser
whereas she formerly had to secure her husband's consent. In order
for her conveyance to be a deed at all she must have the written assent of her husband. 19 The effect of his joindure is two-fold, to
validate her deed 20 and to convey his interest. 2 1 But all of the consideration moves to the wife.22 Under the circumstances of the principal case, she must not only obtain the written assent of the husband
in order to make her deed effective, she must secure the release of
her husband's purchaser as well. Thus she is subjected to difficulties
forbidden by constitution and statute.
Conceding that the conveyance of the husband would not prevent
his joining in his wife's deed insofar as giving his written assent is%
concerned, such conveyance by the husband would render ineffective
any. subsequent attempt to transfer his so-called valuable interest in
the wife's land. Now the wife is entitled tb convey her real estate
as she wishes, save that the written assent of the husband must be
obtained, and her privy examination taken. 23 However, by the conveyance in question the husband has rendered it impossible for the
wife to pass a fee simple to her realty, since the right to the husband's "valuable interest" rests in a third person, the purchaser of
the husband. Granting that the husband has conveyed no portion of
the wife's title, as such, he has rendered it impossible for her to,
convey a full title. Hence, in effect, it is the same as conveying an
interest of the wife in her land.
By logical application the principal case establishes the right of
the husband to convey his curtesy interest as he wills, under form of
an ordinary sale. If the estate of the wife be thus subject to impairment by private sale or court decree of specific performance,
what is the effect of North Carolina Consolidated Statutes §2510,
providing that no real estate of the wife shall be subject to sale or
lease by the husband, save with proper consent of the wife, and that
no interest of the husband whatever in such property shall be subject to sale to satisfy any execution obtained against him, and that
every such sale is null and void? What of North Carolina Const.
N. C. Const., Art. X, §6.
N. C. Const., Art. X, §6.
:Jackson v. Beard, supra note 12.
:Manning v. Manning, supra note 13; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919>

§2510; N. C. Const., Art. X, §6.
"N. C. Const., Art. X, §6; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2510.
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Art. X, §6, providing that the wife's real and personal property "shall
'be and remain the sole and separate estate and property of such
female, and shall not be liable for any debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be devised and bequeathed and, with

the written assent of her husband, conveyed by her as if she were
-unmarried?"
WALTER HoYLE.
Taxation-Situs of Contract for Purchase of
:Federal Property
In Port Angeles Western Ry. Co. v. Ctliam Cowntyl the defendant assessed for taxation the interest of the plaintiff, a Delaware
corporation, in a contract for the purchase of an unfinished railroad
and certain lands lying in the State of Washington, from the United
States. Title was to be retained by the vendor until the full purchase
price had been paid and certain improvements made. In a previous
case between the same parties it was held that the property itself,
the subject matter of the contract, could not be taxed. 2 The present
action was brought under a section of a Washington statute providing that the interest of purchasers under such contracts shall be personal property.3 The court held the assessment valid and refused to
enjoin its collection.
While the title to property remains in the United States either
for the purpose of securing the purchase price or the performance
of precedent conditions, it may not be taxed by the states. 4 When,
however, all that is required of the purchaser under the terms of the
contract has been done by him, a tax may be levied by the state even
though there has been no formal transfer of legal title.5 It is at
36 F. (2d) 956 (W. D. Wash. 1930).
*Port Angeles Western Ry. v. Clallam County, 20 F. (2d) 202 (W. D.
Wash. 1927).

'Laws of Wash. Ex. Sess., c. 130, s. 33.
'Union Pac. Ry. v. McShane, 22 Wall. 444, 22 L. ed. 747 (1874) ; Kansas
Pac. Ry. v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603, 21 L. ed. 373 (1872); Irwin v. Wright,
258 U. S. 219, 42 Sup. Ct. 293, 66 L. ed. 573 (1921), although as between private

parties the vendee may be taxed under such executory contract; Bowls v. City
of Oklahoma City, 24 Okla. 579, 104 Pac. 902, 24 L. R. A. (N.- S.) 1299 (1909),
as may a non-resident mortgagee's interest be taxed; Savings & Loan Soc. v.

Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392, 42 L. ed. 803 (1898).
'State v. Itasca Lumber Co., 100 Minn. 355, 111 N. W. 276 (1907).

"When

the government has no longer any right or interest in the property which would
justify it in witholding the patent, and the purchaser is in possession, the latter

will be treated as the beneficial owner."
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that time and not before that equitable title is considered as havingpassed.6
Whether or not the vendee has such an interest arising from the
existence of such contract as the state may subject to taxation depends upon the nature of the interest and its situs. The purchaser
being a non-resident, the property taxed must of necessity be an interest in the land and railroad as such in order that it have a domestic
situs. 7 Should it be an intangible, whose value is the difference between the purchase price of the property sold under the contract and
the market value of the contract, its situs would be the domicile of
the purchaser. It has been held that a lease upon property owned
by the United States may be taxed to the lessee.8 And possessory
rights in a mining location and in lands granted but not yet patented
for the purpose of building a railroad have been taxed. 9 In such
cases where the interest of the person taxed may be forfeited and
sold under execution without beclouding the title of the United
States to the land itself it would seem that the tax is not open to the
objection that the property of the United States may not be taxed.
But where as in the instant case, the contract may not be alienated
' For the purposes of taxation such view seems correct. The equitable title

of a purchaser under an executory contract between .private parties arises only
from the fact that a court of equity will grant him specific performance. This
type of remedy has now so long been available that it partakes of the nature
of a right in rem. However, it is doubtful whether specific performance may
be had against the United States upon refusal to convey, and it would seem
that the purchaser has neither legal nor equitable title until an actual conveyance has been effected.
' No state may tax that which is not within her jurisdiction. Since the
decision in State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. ed. 179
(1872) it has uniformly been held -that a property tax on intangible interests
may be levied only by the domiciliary state of the debtor except in the case
where the credits have acquired a "business situs." Otherwise, where there is
no jurisdiction over the person, the tax must be upon physical property within
-the territorial limits of the taxing sovereign. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930). And see, Covington v. Covington Nat. Bank, 198 U. S. 10, 25 Sup. Ct. 562, 49 L. ed. 963 (1904) ; Hawley
v. Madden, 232 U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 201, 58 L. ed. 477, Ann. Cas. 1918C 842
(1916); Welch v. City of Boston, 221 Mass, 155, 109 N. E. 174, Ann. Cas.
1917D 946, that there is no process by which the collection of a tax upon a
non-resident's intangibles may be enforced.
'Garland County v. Gaines, 56 Ark. 227, 19 S. W. 602 (1892), even though
the lease provided that there be no assignment without the assent of the Secretary of the Interior.
'Elder v. Wood, 208 U. S. 226, 28 Sup. Ct. 263, 52 L. ed. 464 (1908);
Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762, 24 L. ed. 313 (1876); cf. Irwin v. Wright,
supra note 4. But in this type of case the possession of the lands is tacitly
left open by the United States to anyone who desires to occupy them to develop
their latent resources, 'and the government has no such interest in them as
under valuable contracts of sale.
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except with the consent of the government and then only upon the
assumption of certain conditions, the right in the state to tax might
easily interfere with the discretion of the United States in the disposition of its property.'O
Attempts to tax the interest of a purchaser in United States land
under statutes specifically providing that the interest of the United
States is not assessed and wih other safeguards to the end that no
cloud be cast upon the sovereign's title have not met with success."
No cases have been found permitting the levy of a tax under a
statute which gives to the state an in rem action for its enforcement.
Since the purchaser in the instant case is a non-resident, the
State of Washington may levy no tax against him enforceable in
personam.12
Though it may be highly undesireable that private corporations
should receive the benefit of exemptions from taxation upon highly
valuable properties tied up under long term installment contracts,
yet under the present state of the law the instant case appears to be
incorrectly decided.
HARRY ROCKwELL.
"Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609, 46 Sup. Ct. 592, 70 L. ed.
1112 (1925); Weston v. City of Charleston, 2 Pet. 467, 7 L. ed. 481 (1864).

'In Pacific Spruce Corp. v. Lincoln County, 21 F. (2d) 586 (D. C. Ore.
1927) the statute under which the tax was levied provided that the terms real
property and land shall be construed to include beside the land itself, any
estate, right, title or interest whatever in the land less than the fee simple.
Assessment was made against the "right, title and interest of the plaintiff,
subject to the .paramount title therein of the United States." The court denied
the right to tax, saying, "This section has reference to the res. Consequently
to real property, title to which is vested in the United States. All outstanding
interests or estates therein less than the fee simple are exempt from taxation."
What the interest of the purchaser is, and the construction of the act under
which the tax is levied is not a federal question, and the decisions of the highest state court are controlling. Central Pac. Ry. v. Nevada, 162 U. S. 512, 16
Sup. Ct. 885, 40 L. ed. 1057 (1895). But see Page v. Peirce County, 25 Wash.
7, 64 Pac. 802 (1901); Wildy v. Henry, 86 Wash. 387, 150 Pac. 620 (1915)
holding that the purchaser has no equitable interest in the land subject to
taxation.
In distinguishing the Pacific Spruce Corp. case, the court in ihe instant
case makes it clear that the tax is levied not upon an equitable or possessory
right of the plaintiff in the land, but upon an intangible interest arising from
the assignable value of the contract. The fatal defect in such construction is
apparent. Cf. People v. Burke, 128 Misc. 195, 217 N. Y. Supp. 803 (1926)
where the right to tax under a statute similar to the one in the instant case
was denied.

" Supra note 7.
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Torts-Negligence-Liability of Power Company for
Suspending Service
Plaintiff was undergoing a Caesarian operation at night in a
hospital to which defendant company furnished electricity. The
surgeon, with plaintiff's consent, was to remove the plaintiff's appendix at the same operation. After the child was delivered, but
before the appendix was removed, the defendant company negligently allowed the lights to fail, causing a delay in the operation until
flashlights could be procured and the wound closed. The appendix
was not removed. The plaintiff was occasioned a great loss of blood,
resulting in a weakened condition and physical suffering, and she
has since been suffering from the diseased appendix. Held: the demurrer to the complaint should have been sustained.'
The decision in the instant case was based on a decision wherein
the complaint alleged that by reason of the defendant's negligence in
failing to deliver a message, the plaintiff was forced to give birth to
a child without medical aid, thereby causing her great physical pain
and suffering, and permanent impairment of health.2 In refusing
relief, the court relied on Seifert v. Western Union Teleg. Co.,'
which was based on an analogous situation and in which it was alleged that defendant's negligence caused plaintiff nineteen hours of
most intense suffering, retarded recovery, and brought on an illness
from which plaintiff still suffered. The court, in the Seifert case,
held that itwas bound by the decision in Chapman v,Western Union
Teleg. Co.4 This case was the usual mental anguish case involving
the negligence of the defendant in failing to deliver a death message
promptly. The court decided not to allow recovery for mental
anguish, and concluded: "There was no error in sustaining the demurrer to so much of the plaintiff's petition as sought recovery,
simply for pain and anguish of mind." The court in the Seifert
case indulged in a remarkable process of reasoning to bring the decision under the Chapman case. 5 It is submitted that the instant
'Ga. Power and Light Co. v. Haskins, 151 S. E. 668 (Ga. 1930).
'So. Bell T. & T. Co. v. Reynolds, 139 Ga, 385, 77 S.E. 388 (1913).
'129 Ga. 181, 58 S. E. 699, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1149 (1907).
488 Ga. 763, 15 S. E. 901, 17 L. R. A. 430 (1892).

'The court reasoned that since all physical suffering is accompanied by
more or less mental suffering, and there can be no recovery for mental suffering, then physical suffering is on the same footing with mental suffering and
cannot be a basis for recovery. The court also reasoned that plaintiff's suffering was not the natural and proximate result of defendant's negligence because
it " would have been brought about if there had been no telegraph company
and no message."
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case is based upon an erroneous line of decisions.6 The Georgia
court is leaning over backward in its antagonism to mental anguish
as a basis for recovery.
In the principal case the plaintiff probably would not have been
allowed to recover on the merits. Admitting that the defendant's
negligence was a substantial factor in producing injury to an interest
of the plaintiff which the law recognizes and protects, i.e., prolongation of physical suffering and resultant injury, it is extremely doubtful whether any court would extend the rule of law invoked by the
plaintiff to cover the particular hazard involved.7 An analogous line
of cases is that in which a citizen sues a water company, under contract to the city to keep a sufficient supply of water on hand to fight
fires, for damages to property proximately caused by the breach of
that duty. It seems that only North Carolina, 8 Kentucky, 9 and
Florida1 0 have allowed recovery in such cases, while decisions to
the contrary are numerous.:1 The instant case is more closely analogous to the situation in Stroup v. Alabama Power Co., 1 2 where a
'Independent of the basis on which the Seifert case was decided, the holding is in the minority. The following cases are contra: Western Union Teleg.
Co. v. Church, 90 N. W. 878, 57 L. R. A. 905 (Neb. 1902); Western Union
Teleg. Co. v. Cooper, 71 Tex. 507, 98 S. W. 598 (1888); Carter v. Western
Union Teleg. Co., 141 N. C. 374, 54 S. E. 274 (1906) ; Thompson v. Western
Union Teleg. Co., 107 N. C. 449, 12 S. E. 427 (1890), where the message was
to notify the husband of the feme plaintiff who was about to be confined;
Western Union Teleg. Co. v. McCall, 9 Kan. App. 886, 58 Pac. 797 (1899);
Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Morris, 28 C. C. A. 56, 83 Fed. 992 (C. C. A. 8th,
1897). In McNeal v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 23 Ga, App. 473, 98 S. E.
409 (1919), the Seifert case is cited in denying recovery for mental anguish.
It is cited again in Hendricks v. Jones, 28 Ga. App. 383, 111 S. E. 81 (1922),
lenying recovery for injury received through defendant's negligence in failing
to properly light the stairway, but the court also intimates that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence. See also Western Union Teleg. Co. v.
Knight, 16 Ga. App. 203, 84 S. E. 986 (1915).
'This is according to the analysis of GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE
CAUsE (1927). And see also (1928) The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases,
28 CoL. L. Rav. 1014, by the same author.
'The leading case in North Carolina is Gorrell v. Water Co., 124 N. C.
328, 32 S. E. 720, 46 L. R. A. 513 (1g99). See also Morton v. Washington
Light and Water Co., 168 N. C. 582, 84 S. E. 1019 (1915), which lists the
cases decided since, and adhering to, the Gorrell case.
'Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340, 12 S. W.
554, 7 L. R. A. 77 (1889) ; Lexington Hydraulic and Mfg. Co. v. Oots, 19 Ky.
598, 84 S. W. 774 (1905) ; Graves County Water and Light Co. v. Ligon, 112
Ky. 775, 66 S. W. 725 (1902).
Mugge v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 52 Fla. 371, 42 So. 81, 6 L. R. A.
(N. S) 1171 (1906) ; Woodbury v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 57 Fla, 249, 49
So. 556 (1909).
' See cases collected in Hone v. Presque Isle Water Co., 104 Me. 217, 71

Atl.769 (1908) and Note (1909) 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1021.
'216 Ala. 290, 113 So. 18 (1927).
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demurrer was sustained to a count alleging that feme plaintiff was
being treated in her home by a physician about 2 a.m. when the electric current was cut off, so that the physician was unable to assist
her, to her damage, and that defendant could have notified her of
its intention to suspend the service by the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence.
PEYTON B. ABBoTr, JR.

Torts-Negligence-Proximate Cause
The plaintiff, an engineer on the defendant's railway, was scalded
by a steam plug being blown from the engine boiler and was forced
to jump from his cab. He landed between the rails of an adjacent
track, suffering a broken leg and other severe injuries. While thus
incapacitated, and before aid could reach him, he was further terrified by the approach of an engine upon the track on which he lay.
Also, he heard other employees shouting "Stop 67 !", which increased
his fear of immediate death. The engine was stopped only a few
feet from the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued for damages because of physical injuries and nervous shock, and recovered on both counts. The
decision was affirmed.'
The unique feature of the case is that damages were allowed for
nervous shock which occurred subsequent to the physical injury. The
negligent omission, the physical injury, and the nervous shock, occurred in sequence. In allowing a recovery for nervous shock, the
court treats it as proximately caused by the same negligence that
caused the physical injury, and said that each forms a part of the
natural and indivisible result. 2 From the reported facts, it appears
that the real cause of the nervous shock was the approach of "67"
and the shouts of the spectators.
The decision of the case is to be recognized as an extension of the
recovery for nervous shock. There are yet states that require an
actual impact, causing a contemporaneous nervous injury, and a subsequent physical injury, to permit a recovery for fright. 3 Others
have recognized that such an impact, however slight, is a mere legal
peg4 upon which to hang a recovery when there is a nervous shock
'Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. McBride, 36 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
'Supra note 1 at 842.
'Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354, 34 L. R. A. 731
(1896) (Court is afraid of: (1) Fictitious and fraudulent litigation; (2) Difficulty of ascertaining damages; (3) Recovery against public policy). Spade
v. Lynn & Boston R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897).
'Throckmorton, Damages for Fright (1921) 34 H~av. L. REv.260, 273.
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followed by a consequent physical illness.8 All allow a recovery when
nervous shock and physical injury happen together, and when each
aggravates the other. 6 Few jurisdictions allow a recovery for mental
anguish alone. These recoveries are generally limited to the telegraph cases. 7
The apparient weakness of the principal case is seen in the mechanical method utilized in reaching the decision. The doctrine of
"foreseeability," as a test of causal connection, has been limited 8 and
critidsed9 in recent years. The jury, in determining negligence,
reviews and connects the known facts, and is not called upon to
"foresee" the unknown. It deals with "past actualities and not
future probabilities."10 Also, the question of recovery for nervous
shock should not be, "Was the negligent act too remote?" but, "Have
the courts extended the right of .recovery for fright to take in the
facts of this case?"11 It is submitted that the true test is whether
'Purcell v.St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892) ;

Mack v. South Bound R.Co., 52 S. C. 323, 29 S. E. 905 (1897); Kimberly v.
Howland, 143 N. C.398, 404, 55 S. E .778 (1906) ("If the fright and nervous-

ness is the natural and direct result of the negligent act of the defendant, and
if the fright and nervousness directly cause an impairment of the health or
loss of power, then this -would constitute an injury .. .); Pankopf v. Hinkley,
141 Wis. 146, 123 N. W. 625, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159 (1909).
The English rule is laid down in Ham-brook v. Stokes Bros. (1925) 1 K.
B. 141, 41 L. T. R. 125. According to D. Hughes Parry, Nervous Shock as a
Cause of Action in Tort (1925) 41 LQ. Rav. 297, the plaintiff may recover in
an action for damages for nervous shock suffered as the result of a wrongful
act by the defendant, -provided such shock -has caused physical injury to the
plaintiff as its direct, or contemplated, result. The "act" may assume forms:
physical impact; spoken words; or, conduct causing fright to the plaintiff.
E. F. Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts (1925),
10 CALI L. REv. 461, 487 et seq.
'Stutz v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 73 Wis. 147, 40 N. W. 653 (1888);
Warren v. Boston & Me. R. Co., 163 Mass. 484, 40 N. E. 895 (1895); Consolidated Trac. Co. v. Lambertson, 59 N. J. Law 297, 36 Atl. 100 (1896);
Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. 738, 49 L. R. A. 77 (C. C. A.
9th, 1900) ; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Nelson, 212 Fed. 69 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914);
Penn. R. Co. v. White, 242 Fed. 437 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917).
'A case comment in (1928-29) 3 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 285, discussing Gibbs
v. Western U. Teleg. Co., 196 N. C. 516, 146 S. E. 209 (1929) gives a list of
the states allowing a recovery for mental anguish caused by failure to deliver
death messages. These states are: Texas (1881); Tenn. (1888) ; Ala. (1890) ;
N. C. (1890) ; Iowa (1895) ; Kentucky (1900) ; Nevada (1904). Recovery is
denied in all the other states and in the Federal courts.
"Kimberly v. Howland, srupra note 5, at 402. Throckmorton, Damagest for
Fright (1921) 34 HARv. L. Rav. 260, 271.
'Albert Levitt, Proxiuate Cause and Legal Liability (1920) 90 CENT. L.
Ja. 188; GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE.
"Levitt, op. cit. supra note 9 at 194.
' Throckmorton, op. cit. supra note 8, at 268-272; D. Hughes Parry, op. cit.
supra, note 5.
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the negligence of the defendant was a substantial contributing factor
to the plaintiff's injury. 12 The defendant's negligence in the principal case set the stage for the totality of the plaintiff's injuries,
whether their occurrence was contemporaneous or consecutive.
JAMES A. WILLIAMS.
Levitt, op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 194 et seq.; Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co.
v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. ed. 256 (1896). This case sets up the "foreseeability" test, but bases its decision on the answer to the question, "Did the
facts constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to
make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury?" A consideration of the decision
of the case on the facts -will sustain the test advocated in this comment.

